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Simulation Analysis of the Louisiana UI Tax System: Final Report 
Executive Summary 
OBJECTIVES OF THE PROJECT 
Unemployment insurance (UI) is a federal-state program designed to provide adequate 
partial income replacement to workers during temporary periods of involuntary joblessness. The 
UI system acts as an automatic macroeconomic stabilizer, increasing spending during recessions 
and reducing aggregate spending during recoveries. The program helps prevent recipients from 
slipping into poverty during unemployment.   
This report reviews the recent history of financing regular UI benefits in Louisiana, 
assesses the adequacy of financing, and suggests areas where the financing system could be 
improved. The project aims to identify possible system reforms that will 1) assure long-term 
financial stability, 2) increase tax equity, and 3) simplify procedures. 
OUTLINE OF ANALYSES 
This study examined Louisiana UI benefit and tax provisions and conducted simulation 
analyses of several possible system reforms. Four sets of analyses were undertaken. First, a 
series of macrosimulations were conducted using the Benefit Financing Model (BFM) at the U.S. 
Department of Labor. Second, microsimulations of UI system changes were carried out using 
Louisiana employer microdata. Third, a microsimulation analysis of a major system change from 
reserve ratio to an array tax system was done. Finally, a series of associated investigations were 
conducted. These examined the tax system’s ability to cover socialized UI program costs, the 
persistence of employers in tax rate groups, and procedures for setting the taxable wage base, 
weekly benefit amounts, and the maximum weekly benefit amount (max WBA).  
In particular, the following analyses were performed: 
Macrosmulations:  
• Baseline simulation based on 2011 tax rates
• Recession scenarios relative to 2011 tax baseline: mild, moderate, and severe recessions
• A piecewise linear tax equation less than 2011 with maximum sooner and minimum later
• Recession scenarios of reduced 2011 tax equation: mild, moderate, and severe recessions
• A piecewise linear tax equation approximating 2011 tax rates
• Effects of withdrawing the $400 million Katrina-related federal funding infusion
• Indexing the taxable wage base and maximum weekly benefit amounts to the average
weekly wage in UI-covered employment
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• Restoring tax rates to the 1998 Louisiana UI tax schedule  
Microsimulations: 
• Change tax rates back to what they were in 1998   
• Assign the maximum tax rate (6.2 percent) to employers with reserve ratios of −30 or 
lower (−30 was the 1998 reserve balance for the maximum rate of 6.47 percent)    
• Double taxable wages for all employers with reserve ratios of −30 or lower 
• Assign tax rates based on a linear function of the reserve ratio in range [−30, 15] 
(Employers with a reserve ratio of less than −30 are assigned the maximum, and 
employers with reserve ratios above 15 are assigned the minimum tax rate)   
• Insert additional steps into the 2010 and 2011 rate schedules  
Simulation of an Array tax system: 
• Start with a Nebraska-type array plan 
• Modify Nebraska plan for Louisiana by increasing the years to payback 
• Double-sort employers in the array; first by reserve ratio and second by benefit ratio 
• Examine revenue effects and tax treatment of individual employers 
Ancillary Analyses: 
• Persistence of employers in tax-rate groups over time 
• Computation of tax rates to cover UI system’s socialized costs 
• Adequacy of income replacement 
• Equity of employer tax treatment 
• Indexation of maximum weekly benefit amount and taxable wage base 
LESSONS FOR LOUISIANA UI FINANCING 
1. The current rate structure will provide funding that is barely adequate if the labor market 
steadily improves in the coming years. However, within a few years, reserve levels are 
likely to fall below the $750 million threshold required to permit financing of the 
Louisiana Incumbent Worker Training Fund.    
 
2. The current rate structure would be inadequate if another recession like the 2007-to-2009 
recession happens again. 
 
3. System reserves at the end of 2013’s second quarter are $836 million, but are expected to 
be about $800 million at the end of calendar year 2013. According to federal guidelines 
for forward funding of UI benefits, adequate reserves in 2014 should be $693 million, 
and adequate reserves in 2019 should be $934 million. Without any tax system changes, 
and with steady labor market improvement, Louisiana would reach the 2014 standard but 
not the 2019 funding standard set by the U.S. Department of Labor. If another recession 
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like the one from 2007 to 2009 occurs with the current UI financing system in place, UI 
system reserves will fall to about $250 million within three years of the recession. 
 
4. Benefit levels are too low. Benefits should be based on principles of adequate income 
replacement. Among 53 state UI programs, Louisiana ranks 50th in average weekly 
benefit levels and 51st in average benefits as a percentage of average state covered 
wages.1 Without reforms to the benefit system, the adequacy of wage replacement will 
continue to erode as average earnings in UI-covered employment rise over time.   
 
5. Among 53 state UI programs, Louisiana ranks 52nd in taxes on total wages and 50th in 
the level of the taxable wage base. There is room to improve financing without 
handicapping employers relative to competing states. Tax reforms should be focused on 
rates for negative-balance employers and high-positive-balance employers. That is, the 
bottom and top of the tax-rate distribution. 
 
6. Over the past 10 years, as a percentage of total taxable wages in Louisiana, benefits have 
averaged 2.5 percent, while tax contributions have averaged 1.4 percent. Despite 
exceedingly low benefit levels, there is a structural imbalance between benefits and taxes. 
 
7. Trust-fund triggers should not simultaneously affect the taxable wage base and maximum 
weekly benefit amounts. The current system of procedures for computing the maximum 
WBA and the taxable wage base are procyclical instead of being countercyclical. Under 
the current system, when reserves drop in a recession, then benefits are cut and the tax 
base is increased. Instead of this, a countercyclical system would inject spending during a 
downturn and withdraw spending during an expansion.   
 
8. Tax rates are too low on negative-balance employers, and not just those at the current 
maximum rate. The current maximum rate applies only to employers with reserve ratios 
of −1,000 or lower—that is, employers with debt to the system greater than 10 times their 
taxable payrolls. Dramatic decreases in tax rates have occurred since 1998 for all 
employers with reserve ratios of less than −30. Low maximum rates result in high levels 
of ineffective charges to high-layoff-rate employers. These become socialized costs that 
must be paid for by all employers. 
 
9. High-tax-rate employers with large negative reserve positions tend to remain in the same 
reserve ratio and tax-rate range year after year. In a system of pooled unemployment risk, 
these employers are being subsidized by other employers with stable levels of 
employment.    
 
10. Minimum tax rates are too low on high-positive-balance employers, particularly those 
with reserve ratios over 8.5 (or 8.5 percent of taxable payrolls). Tax rates as low as 0.1 
percent are insufficient to accommodate risk pooling, particularly given the experience-
rated procedure for recovering socialized program costs.   
 
 
1 UI operates in 53 jurisdictions, the 50 states plus DC, Puerto Rico, and Virgin Islands. 
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11. The current funding system jeopardizes reaching forecast reserve levels to assure 
incumbent-worker-fund financing. A modest recession could cause forecast revenue to 
dip far below $750 million. 
 
12. Returning to the 1998 rate schedule would significantly increase system funding. Tax 
treatment of negative balance firms under the 1998 schedule is appealing, particularly for 
employers with reserve balances less than −30. See Figure 2 in the report showing tax 
schedules since 1998.   
 
13. Employer tax rates at the extreme bottom and top of the rate schedule are not responsive 
to changes in net contributions. Accumulated debt or positive reserves make rates 
insensitive to new benefit charges. See the analysis of employer persistence at rate levels. 
 
14. The current overall tax-rate schedule effectively has differing slopes in different ranges. 
Changes in tax rates between steps are not uniform throughout the range. The changes are 
not uniform in either absolute or percentage terms. 
 
15. The rate table could be replaced by rate formulas. Rate formulas should differ for 
positive- and negative-balance employers. There should be a larger jump in rates for 
employers moving from positive to negative reserve positions. A larger difference in 
rates at this threshold would encourage voluntary contributions to move to positive 
reserve positions. Different rate formulas could be in effect, depending on the state of the 
UI trust fund account balance. Given Louisiana’s benefit payment history over the past 
20 years, the fund balance should be about 1 percent of total wages in UI-covered 
employment. 
 
16. In the past few years, about half of all UI beneficiaries are at the maximum weekly 
benefit amount (Table 4). On average, the benefit system replaces much less than one-
half of lost wages—the accepted standard of UI benefit adequacy. Only about half of UI 
beneficiaries receive adequate wage replacement. Adequate wage replacement requires a 
benefit maximum at two-thirds average covered wages, so that 80 percent would get at 
least one-half of wage replacement. Given the current average weekly wage in Louisiana 
of $826, a maximum at two-thirds would be $550, a maximum at one-half would be 
$413, and one-third would be $275. 
 
17. The value of the Louisiana UI system as an automatic countercyclical macroeconomic 
stabilizer for the state economy is low and deteriorating overtime, as wage replacement 
rates continue to decline. 
 
18. Socialized costs have become an increasing share of total system costs in recent years. 
The current system has not been capable of recovering these costs. Currently, the tax to 
pay socialized system-wide costs is experience rated, but recovery of pooled costs should 
be equally shared. A flat tax would accommodate risk sharing and would more reliably 
recover desired revenues. Currently, the social factor is multiplied by the experience-
rated tax rate. Instead, the social factor should be added to the experience-rated tax rate. 
At a minimum, the procedure for computing the social tax should be reviewed.   
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19. Computation of the weekly benefit amount is cluttered with weights that switch, 
depending on the reserve fund balance. Together, these weights increase the WBA below 
the maximum. WBA computation should be simplified, and the maximum indexed. 
 
20. Our final section in this report suggests some incremental policy reforms, and some 
global system changes, that could improve the adequacy of benefits, the equity of taxes, 
and the long-term financial integrity of the Louisiana UI system. 
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Simulation Analysis of the Louisiana UI Tax System: Final Report 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
 Unemployment insurance (UI) is a federal-state program designed to provide adequate 
partial income replacement to workers during temporary periods of involuntary joblessness. This 
report reviews the recent history of financing regular state UI benefits in Louisiana, assesses the 
adequacy of financing, and suggests areas where the financing system may be improved.  
2.  FORWARD FUNDING PRINCIPLE 
 For a state UI system to be sustainable in the long run, revenues should match 
expenditures on average over business cycles. The accepted standard for UI benefit financing is 
based on the principle of forward funding. Having money in reserve when unemployment rises 
means states do not have to increase employer UI taxes immediately during recessions. Forward 
funding prevents UI financing from driving the economy into a worse situation when business 
conditions are weak. Accumulating reserves during economic recoveries puts a slight damper on 
expansions but helps avoid severe financing crises in the depths of recessions. To achieve 
adequate forward funding, state accounts in the federal Unemployment Trust Fund (UTF) should 
maintain balances “sufficient to pay at least one year of unemployment insurance benefits at 
levels comparable to its previous high cost” (ACUC 1996, p. 11). In 2010, this rule was put into 
place as a federal requirement for interest-free loans. The final regulation on this matter was 
published by the U.S. Department of Labor (USDOL) in the Federal Register on September 17, 
2010, as 20 CFR Part 606.   
 
 As an incentive for states to maintain adequate forward funding of UI benefits, the new 
USDOL regulations set reserve requirements for states to maintain privileges for interest-free 
short-term loans. The rules require states to hold one year of reserves in the UTF equal to the 
average of the three highest cost rates experienced in the prior 20 years. This rate is known as the 
average high-cost rate (AHCR). For Louisiana, the current AHCR is 0.98 (USDOL 2012), which 
is just under 1 percent of total wages in UI-covered employment. The new federal regulation 
requires reserve balances to have a high-cost multiple (HCM) of 0.5 in 2014, increasing by 10 
percentage points per year to reach 1.0 in 2019 and thereafter. At the end of the second calendar 
quarter of 2013, reserves in the Louisiana UI trust fund account stood at $836.0 million. That 
was 1.29 percent of total wages paid by UI-contributing Louisiana employers. Required reserves 
to meet the 2019 standard based on the 0.98 AHCR and projected payrolls would be $934.0 
million. In terms of being prepared for UI benefit charges based on the AHCR experience, 
Louisiana ranks second in the nation, meaning it is very adequately prepared. This position gives 
Louisiana significant flexibility in revising the tax and benefit structure of the UI program. This 
report reviews changes that would improve transparency and equity of the system. Transparency 
permits employers to clearly understand their rate determination. Equity is improved when a 
higher share of benefit costs is paid by the employers responsible for the associated joblessness.  
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3.  FACTORS INFLUENCING THE RESERVE POSITION 
 Louisiana had adequate reserves before the recession, but continuous reductions in tax 
rates since 1998 combined with the recession to put fund reserve adequacy at risk. The current 
favorable reserve position was preserved by three factors: 1) forward funding of more than $1.5 
billion achieved in the year 2000 (Table 1), 2) a $400 million federal infusion to reserves 
provided by the federal government following Hurricane Katrina in 2005, and 3) a dramatic 
change in the size and composition of the Louisiana labor force due to migration after Hurricane 
Katrina.   
 
Table 1  Louisiana Unemployment Insurance Financial Information, 1995‒2011 (figures in thousands 
of dollars, except the taxable wage base, which is in dollars) 


















1995 205,428 138,302 1,003,378 11,802,343 0.012 0.017 8,500 
1996 195,802 142,700 1,131,152 11,464,727 0.012 0.017 8,500 
1997 196,364 139,398 1,275,668 12,028,213 0.012 0.016 7,700 
1998 180,723 142,279 1,402,085 11,706,300 0.012 0.015 7,000 
1999 166,428 182,970 1,479,393 11,711,304 0.016 0.014 7,000 
2000 117,101 174,433 1,511,999 11,804,200 0.015 0.010 7,000 
2001 117,837 220,452 1,508,923 11,776,719 0.019 0.010 7,000 
2002 121,979 290,129 1,544,883 11,536,769 0.025 0.011 7,000 
2003 144,455 281,154 1,491,196 11,509,706 0.024 0.013 7,000 
2004 155,458 274,696 1,460,186 11,674,047 0.024 0.013 7,000 
2005 170,896 582,857 1,428,356 12,102,102 0.048 0.014 7,000 
2006 206,914 253,515 1,371,468 12,406,468 0.020 0.017 7,000 
2007 172,725 166,812 1,444,768 12,930,004 0.013 0.013 7,000 
2008 153,942 211,946 1,460,753 13,071,250 0.016 0.012 7,000 
2009 145,081 428,520 1,144,195 12,492,802 0.034 0.012 7,000 
2010 186,521 332,669 895,643 13,434,175 0.025 0.014 7,700 
2011 227,442 360,812 790,309 13,626,313 0.026 0.017 7,700 
2012 221,848 269,412 756,454 14,131,742 0.019 0.016 7,700 
SOURCE: USDOL (2013c).   
 
 Over the past 10 years, income to the Louisiana UI trust fund account from tax 
contributions and interest has remained relatively flat, while benefit payments have exceeded tax 
revenues in most years. As a percentage of taxable payrolls, benefits have averaged 2.5 percent, 
while tax contributions have averaged 1.4 percent (Table 1). Despite exceedingly low benefit 
levels, there is a structural imbalance between benefits and taxes. From a high of $1.5 billion in 
2000, system reserves declined to $790 million at the end of 2011. Since 2000, both the size and 
the composition of the Louisiana labor force have changed dramatically. Katrina-induced 
relocation reduced the burden on the Louisiana UI trust fund during the Great Recession of 
2007‒2009 from what it would have been in the absence of migration.   
 
Based on data from the Current Population Survey (CPS), Coughlin (2012) shows that 
the Louisiana labor force dropped from about 740,000 in 2004 to about 625,000 in 2006, a 
decline of 15.5 percent. Groen and Polivka (2008, p. 40), based on a special supplement to the 
CPS, estimated that about “twenty-three percent of Louisiana natives affected by the storm, 
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representing 8 percent of Louisiana’s population in 2005 were living in another state” one year 
after Katrina hit New Orleans. Of those who had left, Groen and Polivka (2008) estimated that 
the unemployment rate was 30.6 percent among evacuees who did not return to Louisiana but 
only 6.0 percent among those who did return. Additionally, the USDOL reports that Katrina-
associated aid totaled more than $310 million in federally funded disaster unemployment 
assistance (DUA) benefits, paid to 151,610 beneficiaries. A sizable proportion of those federal 
DUA benefits were paid to Louisiana residents, and this reduced the burden on the Louisiana UI 
reserve account. Coughlin (2012) shows that the Louisiana labor force has recovered to about 
690,000, and based on Groen and Polivka’s (2008) evidence, current Louisiana labor-force 
members probably have lower risks of joblessness than those who were working in the state 10 
years ago.   
 
Louisiana UI benefit levels are not the cause of financing challenges. It is the purpose of 
the UI system to partially replace lost income during involuntary joblessness as a bridge to 
reemployment. Benefit levels in Louisiana are not excessive. In relation to the standard set by the 
federal Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation (1996, p. 22), Louisiana UI benefit 
levels are too low. The ACUC recommended that “each state should replace at least 50 percent 
of lost earnings over a six-month period, with a maximum weekly benefit amount equal to two-
thirds of the state’s average weekly wages.” The formula for UI weekly benefit amounts (WBA) 
in Louisiana sets the WBA at 4 percent of average quarterly wages across the four base-period 
quarters.2 This method of computation depresses the replacement rate because jobless periods 
are included in the average. Many states compute benefits on high-quarter wages since such 
quarters are less likely to involve periods of joblessness. Additionally, the Louisiana WBA 
maximum is capped at a dollar amount depending on the level of the system’s reserve balance. 
For 2013, the maximum WBA is set at $247. In July 2013, average weekly earnings in Louisiana 
UI-covered employment were $826. Someone losing a job at the average wage rate would have 
30 percent of their income replaced by the maximum WBA. Adequate wage replacement is 
provided only to those with average weekly earnings up to $406, which is less than half the $826 
average weekly wage in Louisiana. Among 53 state UI programs, Louisiana ranks 50th in 
average weekly benefit levels and 51st in average benefits as a percentage of average state 
covered wages. 
 
Among these 53 state UI programs, Louisiana also ranks 52nd in taxes on total wages and 
50th in the level of the taxable wage base. There is room to improve financing without 
handicapping employers relative to competing states. Tax reforms should be focused on rates for 
negative-balance employers and high-positive-balance employers—that is, the bottom and top of 
the tax rate distribution.  Stagnation in revenues is a consequence of the steady downward drift 
of the Louisiana UI tax table since 1998, as summarized in Figure 1, below. 
 
 
2 Below the WBA maximum, Louisiana law increases the WBA by between 3 and 39 percent, depending 
on the level of system reserves on hand. However, low maximum limits on WBA limit the extent of adequate wage 
replacement among beneficiaries.    
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 To understand the likely effects on system revenues from adjustments to the Louisiana UI 
tax schedule, please examine Figure 2. This graph imposes the existing Louisiana UI tax 
schedule on top of the distribution of UI taxable wages in Louisiana. The horizontal axis is the 
employer UI reserve ratio, taxable wages are measured on the right vertical, and the left vertical 
shows the tax rates associated with different reserve ratios. To improve the visual display, the 
range of reserve ratios is limited to reserve ratios between −50 and 50. As can be seen in Figure 
2, the bulk of taxable wages (purple line) in Louisiana are in the positive range of reserve ratios 
less than 10. Any increase or decrease in the tax schedule over this range will have large effects 
on total contributions to the UI reserve account. The current 2012 tax schedule is the blue step 
function. The red line in the graph presents a piecewise linear approximation to the step function 











Figure 1  Louisiana Statutory UI Tax Rates, 1998-2012
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003





















Figure 2 Louisiana Tax Rates and Taxable Payrolls, 2012
Tax Rate Slope Taxable Payroll
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4. SIMULATION ANALYSES 
 The core methodological tool used in this study of the Louisiana UI system is simulation 
analysis. The analysis examines the effects of possible changes in parameters of the existing 
reserve-ratio UI benefit financing system. Macrosimulation analyses were done with the U.S. 
Department of Labor (USDOL) microsimulation tool called the Benefit Financing Model (BFM). 
Microsimulation analyses were done using Louisiana employer data from program 
administrative records. These analyses examined impacts on employer taxation of system 
parameter changes. An entirely different tax system, called an array system, was also examined 
using the employer microadministrative data. 
 
Under Louisiana Law Revised Statute (LRS) 23:1474, effective July 1, 2008, the 
following four procedures apply for setting program parameters, depending on the Louisiana 
unemployment trust fund (LUTF) balance: 
 
1) If the LUTF < $750 million, then Max WBA = $221 and TWB = $8,500, and below Max 
WBA the WBA = (1/25)*(Average of 4 base-period quarterly 
earnings)*(0.95)*(1.03)*(1.05). 
 
2) If $750 million < LUTF <= $1.15 billion, then Max WBA = $247 and TWB = $7,700, 
and below Max WBA the WBA = (1/25)*(Average of 4 base-period quarterly 
earnings)*(0.97)*(1.05)*(1.15). 
 
3) If $1.15 billion < LUTF < $1.4 billion, then Max WBA = $258 and TWB = $7,000, and 
below Max WBA the WBA = (1/25)*(Average of 4 base-period quarterly 
earnings)*(1.05)*(1.15). 
 
4) If $1.4 billion < LUTF, then Max WBA = $284 and TWB = $7,000, and below Max 
WBA the WBA = (1/25)*(Average of 4 base-period quarterly earnings)*(1.05)*(1.32). 
 
These four procedures are effective for the macrosimulations and several microsimulations 
conducted. Simplification and reform of these rules would be a fruitful area for policy action.  
4.1 Macrosimulations 
 Macrosimulation analyses rely on the BFM managed by the USDOL.3  “The Benefit 
Financing Model (BFM) is an econometric forecasting model designed to help analysts project 
the condition of their Unemployment Insurance (UI) trust funds several years into the future, and 
quickly assess the financial impact of various economic scenarios and possible law changes.” 
(USDOL 2010, p. 1).    
 
 The BFM is maintained by the USDOL’s Division of Fiscal and Actuarial Services, 
Office of Unemployment Insurance, Employment and Training Administration, in Washington, 
 
3 Macrosimulation analysis of the Louisiana UI benefit financing system was previously presented in a 
series of interim reports by O’Leary and Pittelko (2013a,b,c). 
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D.C. Professional staff at USDOL reinitialized the BFM with data for Louisiana through 2011. 
The BFM requires users to input forecast values for three exogenous variables: 1) Total 
unemployment rate, 2) Wage growth rate, and 3) Labor force growth rate. The baseline 
simulation used forecast values of the exogenous variables provided by the Louisiana Workforce 
Commission, as prepared by Moody’s Analytics. 
 
The unemployment rate input to the model may be either the total unemployment rate 
(TUR) or the insured unemployment rate (IUR). We input the IUR series below for simulations.4 
Table 2 presents the forecast values of the exogenous variables used in the simulations. The table 
also lists the taxable and total payrolls for the baseline simulation. The IUR values for the mild, 
moderate, and severe economic scenarios are listed in Table 3. The economic scenario 
simulations result in different levels of total and taxable payrolls (Table 3). 
 
Macrosimulation analyses were performed for the following cases: 
 
• Baseline simulation based on 2011 tax rates 
• Recession scenarios relative to 2011 tax baseline: mild, moderate, severe recessions 
• A piecewise linear tax equation less than 2011, with maximum sooner and minimum later  
• Recession scenarios of reduced 2011 tax equation: mild, moderate, severe recessions 
• A piecewise linear tax equation approximating 2011 tax rates  
• Effects of withdrawing the $400 million Katrina-related federal funding infusion 
• Indexing the taxable wage base and maximum weekly benefit amounts to the average 
weekly wage in UI-covered employment 
• Restoring tax rates to the 1998 Louisiana UI tax schedule 
 
Table 2  Values of Exogenous Variables for Macrosimulations using BFM  
LWC — Moody’s Analytics 
IUR 





growth Taxable Total Mild Mod Severe 
2012 7.15 0.62 1.98 2.00 14,120 63,154 2.00 2.00 2.00 
2013 6.77 0.76 3.76 2.00 14,395 66,025 2.00 2.00 2.00 
2014 7.24 0.69 6.41 2.00 14,780 70,742 2.75 3.00 3.47 
2015 6.62 0.83 6.67 2.00 15,216 76,088 2.00 2.50 3.59 
2016 5.76 0.69 6.23 1.67 15,728 81,660 1.67 1.67 2.82 
2017 5.31 0.33 5.91 1.36 16,199 87,043 1.36 1.36 1.36 
2018 5.22 0.11 5.08 1.35 16,524 91,573 1.35 1.35 1.35 
2019 5.14 0.04 4.18 1.40 16,775 95,390 1.40 1.40 1.40 
2020 5.09 0.04 4.13 1.46 17,029 99,309 1.46 1.46 1.46 
2021 5.07 −0.02 4.11 1.53 17,277 103,298 1.53 1.53 1.53 




4 The rationale for the IUR series is explained in our memo to the LWC dated February 12, 2013. 
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Table 3  Taxable and Total Payrolls Assumed during Economic Scenarios ($ millions) 
 Mild recession Moderate Severe 
Year Taxable Total Taxable Total Taxable Total 
2012 14,120 63,154 14,120 63,154 14,120 63,154 
2013 14,405 66,022 14,408 66,021 14,413 66,020 
2014 14,588 70,203 14,531 70,021 14,427 69,679 
2015 15,209 76,090 15,072 75,704 14,793 74,859 
2016 15,728 81,660 15,724 81,662 15,391 80,714 
2017 16,199 87,043 16,199 87,043 16,189 87,047 
2018 16,524 91,573 16,524 91,573 16,524 91,573 
2019 16,775 95,390 16,775 95,390 16,775 95,390 
2020 17,029 99,309 17,029 99,309 17,029 99,309 
2021 17,277 103,298 17,277 103,298 17,277 103,298 
SOURCE: Louisiana Workforce Commission. 
 
4.2  Macrosimulations Methodology and Results:  Baseline Simulation Based on 2011 Rates  
 
We provide the baseline results for the existing system computed over the calendar year. 
The macrosimulation is based on the 2011 rate schedule to make results comparable to the 
microanalysis done on administrative employer data for 2011. The following refinements 
improved the baseline concordance with actual financial outcomes. First, based on the recent 
historical relationship between total and insured unemployment, we adjusted the IUR in the early 
years of the simulation as summarized in Table 2. The taxable and total payrolls for the recession 
scenarios are given in Table 3. We also adjusted the factors to account for benefits below the 
maximum, since about half of all beneficiaries during the simulation forecast period will receive 
the maximum WBA if the current procedures 1 to 4 remain in place (Table 4). 
 
Table 4  Louisiana UI Claimants at Maximum Weekly Benefit Amount, 2002‒2011 
Year Maximum WBA ($) 
Claimants at  
maximum WBA Total claimants 
% claimants 
at maximum WBA 
2002 258 54,612  132,746  41.14 
2003 258 52,170  130,898  39.85  
2004 258 50,704  125,942  40.25  
2005 258 148,785  342,808  43.40  
2006 258 37,205  90,149  41.27  
2007 258 40,002  85,577  46.74 
2008 258 76,098  152,848  49.79 
2009 284 100,441  183,271  54.80  
2010 247 77,833  166,050  46.87 
2011 247 70,640  151,166  46.73 
SOURCE: Louisiana Workforce Commission unpublished data. 
 
When the balance in the UI trust fund account crosses the reserve thresholds for the four 
procedures, the BFM is set up to change the taxable wage base and the maximum weekly benefit 
amount; however, the formula for WBA below the maximum does not automatically change in 
the BFM. Therefore, total benefit payments in the simulation must be adjusted for each year the 
reserve fund balance requires a procedure different from Procedure 2. The simulation starts in 
2012 when Procedure 2 is in place. In the baseline simulation, Procedure 1 becomes effective in 
2016 for two years. For this transition, our adjustment is to decrease aggregate benefit payments 
by 1.0 percent in years that Procedure 1 is in operation.   
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Using data from 2007 to 2011, we were able to estimate the relationship between the 
WBA and the average weekly wage (AWW) in covered employment. When the procedure 
changes from 2 to 1, the parameters in the formula suggest the WBA is a lower percentage of the 
AWW (Table 5). Unfortunately, we do not have data for any year when Procedure 1 is in effect. 
We computed the slope and intercept of the line suggested by data from 2007 to 2011 for the 
relationship between the average benefit replacement rate and the average weekly benefit level 
suggested by the WBA formula. From these, we imputed the average replacement rate under 
Procedure 1. The aggregate effect on benefit payments is to lower total compensation by an 
additional 1 percent. Note that this effect is in addition to the decline in aggregate benefit 
payments resulting from the lower maximum WBA ($221) being effective for more beneficiaries 
under Procedure 1 than Procedure 2.   
 
Table 5  Louisiana UI Weekly Benefit Amount Computation Factors 
Procedure Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 WBA factor index 
1 0.95 1.03 1.05 102.74 
2 0.97 1.05 1.15 117.13 
3 1.00 1.05 1.15 120.75 
4 1.00 1.05 1.32 138.60 
SOURCE: Author’s computations.  UI weekly benefit amount (WBA) is calculated as (1/25)*(average quarterly wages in the 
four base-period quarters)*(WBA factor index/100). 
 
The baseline economic scenario assumes there will not be a serious recession in the next 
10 years and suggests the current system will generate adequate income from benefit charges to 
preserve system solvency. System reserves at the end of 2013’s second quarter are $836 million 
but are expected to be about $800 million at the end of the calendar year. According to federal 
guidelines for forward funding of UI benefits, system reserves should grow to $693 million by 
2014 and $934 million by 2019. Without any tax system changes and steady labor market 
improvement, Louisiana would reach the 2014 standard but not the 2019 funding standard set by 
USDOL (Figure 3): the 2019 reserve balance will be about $100 million below the federally set 
target. Additionally, the forecast calendar-year-end balances for 2015 and 2016 are below the 
$750 million requirement for funding the incumbent worker training fund (Table A1). Results 
from all the macrosimulations on the calendar year end UI trust fund account balance over time 
are reported in Appendix A. 
 
4.3  Recession Scenarios Relative to the 2011 Tax Baseline 
 
The unemployment assumptions for the mild, moderate, and severe recession scenarios 
are listed in Table 2. Simulation results are reported in Appendix Table A1 and graphically in 
Figure 3. Forecast reserve levels bottom out in 2016 under all three recession scenarios. Reserve 
levels are forecast to be $667 million, $534 million, and $199 million in 2016 under the mild, 
moderate, and severe recession scenarios, respectively. The baseline and all three recession 
scenarios suggest insufficient levels of reserves to fund the incumbent worker training fund. 
Without financing modifications, neither the baseline nor any recession scenarios result in 
adequate funding by 2019, the year when the USDOL criterion for forward funding for 
Louisiana amounts to about 1 percent of taxable wages in reserves.   
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4.4  A Piecewise Linear Tax Equation of 2011 Rates, Shift in, and Economic Scenarios 
 
Examination of the employer administrative data showed a distribution of UI tax rates 
since 1998 with about 2,500 employers having large negative reserve ratios and compressed into 
tax rates about half the maximum level, leaving only a few dozen employers at the maximum. 
About 40 employers remain at the maximum tax rate of 6.2 percent, and these employers have 
outstanding benefit charges at least 10 times their average annual taxable wages.   
 
The smoothed-step tax schedule examined in the microsimulations has 91 steps in the 
reserve ratio range [−30, 15], with tax rates changing with every 0.5-point change in the reserve 
ratio. A linear approximation to the 2011 tax schedule is derived algebraically in Appendix B. 
However, for the macrosimulations the BFM (Benefit Financing Model) at USDOL can only 
accommodate a maximum of 70 steps. Therefore, the BFM cannot simulate the precise linear tax 
schedule in Appendix B. Rather than truncating the schedule at both ends to reduce it to 70 steps, 
I increased the height of the steps at the top and bottom of the schedule. The tax rate is changed 
when the reserve ratio changes by a full point instead of a half-point. For example, in the 
microsimulation, a reserve ratio of −7.6 yielded a tax rate of 3.39, and a reserve ratio of −7.3 
yielded a tax rate of 3.33, but for the BFM macrosimulations, we assign a rate 3.33 for the whole 
range of −7.0 to −7.9. For reserve ratios higher than −7.0, the macrosimulations follow the same 
pattern of tax rates as the microsimulation, with rates dropping for each one-half-point 
improvement in reserve ratios. This method of simplification was adopted because there are 
relatively few employers (about 12 percent) with reserve ratios between −7.5 and −30.0. Since, 
on average, tax rates are lower using this compressed schedule for tax-rate assignments, the 
revenue estimate will tend to be lower than under the microsimulation.   
 
In Figure 4, the red line is the BFM approximation of the linearized tax schedule used in 
the microsimulation and applied to the macrosimulation. This red line pivots slightly above the 
green line, representing the fact that social charges are added to the basic rate, as an increasing 










Figure 3  Calendar Year End Reserve Balance under Baseline and Recession Scenarios
Baseline Mild Moderate Severe
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graphed in Figure 2, along with an approximation of the taxable wage distribution. Finally, the 
light blue line that is shifted (by 0.6 percentage points) in parallel to the first linear 
approximation is a piecewise linear tax schedule designed to generate somewhat less revenue 
than the 2011 schedule. Comparing the light blue and dark blue lines, we see the huge tax cut 
given to positively rated employers by the shifted-in tax equation, and the revenue increase 






The blue line in Figure 5 shows the simulated path of calendar-year-end reserve balances 
if the linear approximation of the 2011 tax system is in place. Details of simulation results are 
given in Appendix Table A3. Year-end reserve balances are nearly double the reserve levels of 
the standard 2011 rate schedule. Since this simulation generated excess revenues, a linear form 
shifted in by 0.6 percentage points was simulated. Figure 5 shows the path of year-end reserves 
as the red line. As summarized in Appendix Table A3, this form, too, generates year-end reserve 
levels in excess of adequacy requirements, given our baseline labor-market assumptions. 
Nonetheless, this exercise illustrates the potential of using a set of linear tax schedules.   
 
We repeated the three economic-scenario simulations with the shifted-in linear 
approximation of the tax system in place for each scenario. The bottom-line results are 
summarized in Figure 5 and Appendix Table A4. A mild one-year rise in unemployment lowers 
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the reserve balance by about $50 million per year over the course of the simulation to 2021, but 
the system will reach adequate funding by 2019. A two-year moderate recession lowers year-end 
reserves by $75‒$80 million per year, and the system recovers to adequate funding by 2019. If 
another recession like the 2007‒2009 one occurs with the current UI financing system in place, 
UI system reserves will fall to about $250 million within three years, and the system will not 
reach adequate funding levels by 2019. In the worst-case scenario, simulated 2019 reserves reach 




4.5  Procedures 1‒4 Revised by Setting the Taxable Wage Base and Max WBA as Functions 
of the Average Weekly Wage in UI-Covered Employment 
 
We replaced the four procedures with formulas for taxable wage base (TWB) and 
maximum weekly benefit amounts indexed to average weekly wages in UI-covered employment. 
As of the third quarter of 2013, the AWW equals $825.81 in Louisiana. To conduct simulations 
using the BFM, we are limited to four sets of values for Max WBA and TWB. We extrapolated 
the AWW using the Louisiana Workforce Commission forecast of wage growth provided by 
Moody’s Analytics, as given in Table 2. We compute the Max WBA as one-third the AWW (this 
is half the accepted standard of adequacy, which is two-thirds), and we index the TWB at one-
quarter of the AWW earned in a calendar quarter (TWB = 0.25*AWW*13). To run our 
simulation to 2021, we assume the average of 2014 and 2015 for the period 2012‒2015, then we 
increase the Max WBA and TWB every two years after that time, based on the average AWW of 
those two years. Table 6 presents the imputed values for Max WBA and TWB. The Benefit 
Financing Model (BFM) computes WBA values below the maximum.   
 
Table 6  Values for Macrosimulations of Indexed Maximum Weekly Benefit Amount and Taxable Wage Base 
Year Wage growth (%) AWW ($) Max WBA ($) TWB ($) 
2012 1.98 817 300 11,805 
2013 3.76 826 300 11,805 










Figure 5  Calendar Year End Reserve Balance under Linear Tax Schedule Shifted Down 
and Recession Scenarios
Linear Linear Shift Down Mild Moderate Severe
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2015 6.67 937 300 11,805 
2016 6.23 996 338 13,327 
2017 5.91 1,055 338 13,327 
2018 5.08 1,108 373 14,707 
2019 4.18 1,154 373 14,707 
2020 4.13 1,202 405 15,949 
2021 4.11 1,252 405 15,949 
SOURCE: Table 2 and author’s computations. 
 
This approach would help retain real levels of benefit adequacy and match these with 
funding adequacy over time, as average earnings grow in Louisiana. The UI weekly benefit 
amount in Louisiana is computed as 4 percent of average quarterly wages in the earnings base 
period, multiplied by the index of WBA factors set by the procedure in effect, given the fund 
reserve position. The UI-earnings base period is the first four of the last five completed calendar 
quarters before the quarter of UI application. For 2013, the minimum WBA is $10 and the 
maximum $247. The WBA factor index for 2013 is 117.13, meaning that the WBA is 4 percent 
of average base-period earnings multiplied by 1.1713, with a minimum of $10 and maximum of 
$247.   
 
Under current Louisiana UI procedures, if the risk of job loss is uniform throughout the 
earnings distribution, and the earnings distribution is normal and symmetric around the mean, 
then less than one-quarter of beneficiaries receive at least one-half wage replacement. Since the 
earnings distribution is skewed with the long tail to the right, the mean is greater than the 
median, so that somewhat more than one-quarter of Louisiana beneficiaries receive adequate 
wage replacement, but certainly less than half of beneficiaries do in 2013 under Procedure 2. The 
current system provides inadequate income replacement; furthermore, spending from the system 
is depressed during recessions and boosted somewhat during expansions as the fund is 
replenished—this is a procyclical process that accentuates swings in business cycles. The aim 
should be to have 50 percent wage replacement for at least 80 percent of those who are 
involuntarily joblessness (ACUC 1996). The UI system should add to aggregate spending during 
recessions and reduce aggregate spending during expansions, not the opposite.   
 
 
Figure 6  Calendar Year End Reserve Balance under Baseline and Selected Changes
Baseline 1998 Tax Rates Index T and W + $400 m
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The benefit formula could be simplified by eliminating the WBA computation factors 
listed in Table 5. On net, the set of factors increase the WBA amount in every procedure. These 
factors are relics of political efforts to boost or restrain benefit levels. A simpler and more 
adequate system would result from eliminating the factors and indexing the maximum WBA to 
the average weekly wage in covered employment. Similarly, the minimum WBA could be 
indexed to the earnings implied by the minimum wage payable in the state. The modest earnings-
qualification requirements of $800 in the high quarter and $1,200 in the base period 
accommodate access to the system, but the $10 minimum WBA is meager.  
 
Since all default procedures in the BFM inflate WBA below the maximum once it gets 
beyond 4 percent of average quarterly earnings, the benefit payment costs for the simulations are 
somewhat overstated. Indexing the TWB and Max WBA could permit elimination of the WBA 
multipliers in computation, particularly if the minimum can be raised to one-half the minimum 
hourly wage times twenty, or about $75. 
 
Simulation of the indexed TWB and Maximum WBA suggest that annual year-end 
reserves would be modestly higher than the baseline simulation on 2011 rates. The indexed 
system would certainly yield a better forward-funded system that would automatically respond to 
recessions. Detailed results in Appendix Table A5 show that the financing burden would increase 
under indexed TWB and Max WBA, but the increased TWB would provide latitude for lowering 
the rate schedule across the board and increasing tax equity by recovering a higher proportion of 
system costs from those who generate the bulk of benefit charges.    
 
4.6   A $400 Million Post-Katrina Grant Preserved Louisiana’s System Reserves 
 
In 2006, following the huge increase in regular UI payments in Louisiana due to 
Hurricane Katrina, the federal government stepped in to assist the state by infusing $400 million 
to the UI trust fund account. A simulation summarized in Figure 6 and Appendix Table A5 
reveals the difficult situation Louisiana would have been in under the present tax system had the 
infusion not been granted. System reserves would be $489 million in 2015 and would reach only 
$621 in 2019—far below the federal adequacy target level of $934 million in 2019.   
 
4.7  A Return to the 1998 Tax System 
 
Returning to the 1998 tax system would result in a significant boost in revenues to the 
Louisiana UI trust fund account. Indeed, a return to a system at or near the 1998 level would be 
sufficient to modestly improve the benefit adequacy of UI wage replacement. As shown in 
Figure 2, the 1998 tax schedule reaches the maximum of 6.47 at a −30 reserve ratio and is higher 
throughout the reserve ratio range than all rate schedules since. The macrosimulation results 
reported in Appendix Table A5 indicate that in 2014 the system would be in Procedure 2 with a 
maximum WBA of $247 and system reserves of $931 million. This level of reserves is sufficient 
to improve benefit levels while maintaining adequate forward funding. If the 1998 tax schedule 
stayed in place, by 2019 reserves would reach $1.3 billion, with the maximum WBA reaching 
$258. However, if benefit provisions remain unchanged until 2019, the wage replacement rate 
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for those earning the average weekly wage would be only 22 percent. Only a small fraction of all 
UI beneficiaries would receive adequate wage replacement at 50 percent of lost earnings.   
4.8  Microsimulation Summary 
Louisiana’s UI program administrative data on employers was provided for calendar 
years 2006 to 2011.5 To perform microsimulation analysis, we restricted the sample to active 
experience-rated employers—that is, employers with at least three years of taxable wages 
observed in the period 2006 to 2011. Given that we need three years of prior data, analysis 
samples were constructed for years 2010 and 2011. We also received a variable in the microdata 
that indicated experience-rating eligibility or not. Many ineligible employers are nonprofits and 
government agencies that have chosen to be reimbursing instead of contributing employers. 
Therefore, our sample selection required the experience-rating eligibility variable to indicate 
“yes” in the fiscal year for the employer to be included in the sample. Last, we removed 
employers that became “inactive.” Any employer that had an inactivity date between 2006 and 
2011 was removed from the sample. From initial samples of 96,419 in 2010 and 97,491 in 2011, 
after excluding employers without three years of prior observed experience and without an 
indicator of experience-rating eligibility, there remained 60,523 for 2010 and 66,717 for 2011 in 
our samples for analysis. These employers constitute the great majority of contributing UI 
taxable employers for those years. The industrial composition and distribution of UI tax rates 
among these employers is representative of the universe of Louisiana UI taxable employers.   
 
 The 2006–2008 period included some relatively “good” years, while the years from 2009 
to 2011 were relatively “poor,” including a recession and modest recovery. We looked at positive 
and negative balance experience-rated employers as two separate groups and asked the question, 
“Annually, how much cash are these employers contributing to or costing the UI system?” Over 
the full time period, the system lost an average of $62 million per year, with most of that decline 
caused by negative-balance employers. Excluding the four calendar quarters most affected by 
Katrina, the annual decline in net system reserves was still nearly $47 million. And for fiscal 
year 2010 alone, while economic recovery was underway, the decline in system reserves was 
$64.3 million, with net contributions of $4.5 million from positive-balance employers and net 
charges of $68.8 million by negative-balance employers. 
 
 Benefits for workers separated from high negative-balance employers are being fully and 
indefinitely financed by other employers in Louisiana. In 2011, there were 2,385 experience-
rated employers with reserve ratios of −30 or lower. Collectively, those with reserve ratios of 
−30 or lower were in the red by a total of $605 million as of June 30, 2010 (the computation date 
for determining the 2011 tax rate). The average tax rate for these employers was about 3.9 
percent, well below the current maximum of 6.20 percent and the 6.47 rate that applied to all 
such employers in 1998. Among negative-balance employers listed with reserve balances better 
than −30, all tax rate groups had negative net contributions over the 2007‒2011 period. Under 
the current system, the majority of these employers would never pay back their accumulated 
debts to the UI system.  
 
 Taken together, the 2011 positive-balance experience-rated employers contributed $18 
 
5 Complete documentation of our microsimulation analysis is available as O’Leary and Kline (2013b).   
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million more in taxes than they used in benefits over the period FY 2007–2011. Considering 
these employers by 2011 tax rate groups, most brackets show positive net contributions for that 
year, with a total of $4.5 million positive. The exceptions are for small positive reserve ratios in 
the ranges of 1.2‒1.6 and 2.0‒2.4; for the range 6.8‒7.0; and for all employers above 7.6. A 
positive reserve ratio of 7.6 means the employer has net positive contributions equal to 7.6 
percent of the taxable wage base. As of 2011, more than 22,000 Louisiana employers have 
accumulated net contributions of 9.5 percent or more of their UI taxable wages. However, 
between 2007 and 2011, there were net negative contributions from this group of $1.7 million on 
average each year, with a deficit of $8.6 million in 2011 alone.  
 
The following microsimulations were performed using employer administrative data.6 
 
• Change tax rates back to what they were in 1998.   
• Assign the maximum tax rate (6.2 percent) to employers with reserve ratios of −30 or 
lower (−30 was the 1998 reserve balance for the maximum rate of 6.47 percent).    
• Double taxable wages for all employers with reserve ratios of −30 or lower. 
• Assign tax rates based on a linear function of the reserve ratio in range [−30, 15]. 
(Employers with a reserve ratio of less than −30 are assigned the maximum, and 
employers with reserve ratios above 15 are assigned the minimum tax rate.)   
• Insert additional steps into the 2010 and 2011 rate schedules  
 
 Examination of the pattern of net contributions in the previous five years suggests the 
current system for revenues is not sustainable over the long term, even if labor market conditions 
continue to improve. A full exposition of the microsimulation analysis is given in Appendix B of 
this report. Here we summarize the results by focusing on the impact on system revenues relative 
to the micro baseline in five ways: 1) returning to the 1998 tax system would have increased 
revenues by 73.1 percent in 2010 and by 49.6 percent in 2011, 2) starting the maximum rate at 
the −30 reserve ratio would have increased revenues by 7.0 percent in 2010 and 6.6 percent in 
2011, 3) doubling the tax base below −30 would have increased revenues by 11.1 percent in 
2010 and 11.4 percent in 2011, 4) introducing linearized rate formulas between the −30 and 15 
reserve ratios would have increased revenues by 12.9 percent in 2010 and 9.5 percent in 2011, 
and 5) switching to uniform steps in the rate table would have increased revenues by 12.0 
percent in 2010 and 9.4 percent in 2011.   
4.9  Simulation Analysis of an Array Tax System 
 Array methodologies for assigning UI tax rates have been adopted by a several programs 
in the United States. The eleven array states are Alaska, Idaho, Kansas, Maine, Montana, 
Nebraska, North Dakota, Oregon, South Carolina, Utah, and Vermont (USDOL 2013a). 
Somewhat like benefit-ratio tax systems, the array systems improve the responsiveness of 
 
6 The reform suggested in the December 2012 study design document, which would raise taxes only on 
employers at the maximum tax rate for three consecutive years, is not included in the microsimulations list. 
Investigation of employer microdata revealed that the plan would focus changes on fewer than 40 employers and 
would have an inconsequential effect on system reserves. A broader reform is needed to address the structural tax 
problems that have gradually emerged since 1998 concerning the tax treatment of employers with reserve ratios of 
−30 or lower.   
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financing by weakening the link to accumulated positive reserves and accumulated debts. Under 
reserve ratio systems, a large proportion of high-positive-balance employers are insulated from 
rate changes by years of accumulated contributions. Similarly, limits on tax rates and taxable 
wage bases mean that employers with large debts and regular annual UI benefit charges are 
unlikely to ever see rate reductions. The array system has the potential of re-sorting employers 
into different rate groups every year. The method also increases the reliability of revenue 
forecasting and the means to maintain adequate system reserves. The downside is a potential for 
the system to be procyclical. Additionally, the effects on tax equity are uncertain.   
 
 Using employer administrative data from Louisiana in 2009‒2011, we started our 
simulation of an array methodology with the model of the Nebraska system.7 In that model, the 
average tax rate for the next year is based on state-wide regular UI benefit charges in the year 
prior as a percentage of statewide taxable wages. This average tax rate is then adjusted up or 
down by a “yield factor” that reflects the level of the UI trust. Since the 2019 forward-funding 
reserve target for Louisiana is nearly $1 billion, we chose that dollar amount as a target for our 
simulation exercise. That level represents about 1.6 percent of statewide total wages in 2011. 
This ratio falls in the 1.50-to-1.65 percent range associated with a 1.00 yield factor in the 
Nebraska schedule. A 1.00 yield factor is intended to keep relative system reserves at the current 
level, as higher yield factors accumulate reserves, and lower factors result in tax relief when 
reserves are more than adequate.   
 
 The average tax rate multiplied by the yield factor gives the target tax rate. Individual 
employer tax rates are set to generate system revenues, producing the overall average target rate 
of revenue. I construct a set of 20 different employer rates based on the distribution of employer 
benefit charge experience. Employers are sorted by reserve ratio, then employers are divided into 
20 groups with equal amounts of combined employer-taxable wages. For the initial simulation, 
we used the Nebraska table of rate factors for experience. The rates for employers in each group 
were then assigned by directly applying the Nebraska methodology over the three-year, 2009–
2011 simulation period. This array method increased tax contributions by 27.8 percent over what 
Louisiana employers actually paid in those years. The resulting contributions exceeded the target 
level of revenue needed by the Louisiana UI system. Further refinements were then examined.    
 
 The Nebraska system essentially operates on a “pay as you go” principle. It is designed to 
account for the prior year’s UI benefit charges and generate revenue sufficient to raise reserves 
to the target level in one year. When applied to the 2009–2011 simulation time frame, which 
included a massive recession, this resulted in an undesirable procyclical adjustment process. 
Because of substantial UI benefit charges, employers faced significant tax increases just as the 
economy was emerging from the severe downturn. Also, the Nebraska experience-factor 
schedule that distributed the target tax rate to the employer level raises equity questions when 
applied to Louisiana. The system failed to sufficiently increase tax rates on Louisiana employers 
that were heavily indebted to the UI system, while raising rates on employers with large positive 
account balances.8 
 
7Details of our simulations are presented in O’Leary and Kline (2013a).   
8This is not intended as a critique of the UI financing system in Nebraska. We have no data from the state 
of Nebraska and no opinion concerning the impact of the financing system in that state. The modifications to the 
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In an attempt to improve on the Nebraska methodology, we made two substantive 
changes—the sorting into rate groups and the payback time horizon. The specific employers 
assigned to the 20 experience-factor groups were modified by first sorting on employers’ 
observed reserve ratios, and then sorting on employers’ recent benefit charges relative to taxable 
payrolls. The new distribution of employers substantially shifted UI tax rates to more closely 
align with UI-benefit charge experience in the microdata sample. We believe this process 
improved tax equity over the pure Nebraska methodology. 
 
 Second, we extended the time period over which the average tax rate was determined 
from one year to five years. This reduces the procyclical effects of the system. As of the 
computation date, the average tax rate for the coming year was defined as statewide regular UI-
benefit charges in the five years preceding the computation date as a percentage of statewide 
taxable wages in the same five-year period. This change allows a more gradual adjustment of tax 
rates. By this process, tax increases following a rise in benefit charges due to a recession would 
be phased in over a longer period, when the economy would likely be in a recovery phase. 
 
 These changes resulted in a simulated 14.6 percent increase in revenue over the 2009–
2011 period, compared with a 27.8 percent increase using the strict Nebraska method. The 
smaller increase in revenues results mainly from the average tax rate being computed over a 
longer period of five years. Cost recovery from the Great Recession will require time under any 
methodology. However, when revenue estimates for 2012 were included in the adjusted array 
methodology, the percentage rise in revenues increased to 22.6 percent over actual Louisiana 
levels observed.   
 
 Refinements of the Nebraska system shifted tax burdens toward employers with histories 
of higher benefit charges. Employers heavily indebted to the UI system that had been greatly 
subsidized were given tax increases. Furthermore, employers with histories of contributing more 
to the system than they used in UI benefit charges were given some tax relief. With the available 
data, particularly if Fiscal Year 2006 is excluded because of Hurricane Katrina, we find the 
modified Nebraska methodology to be a substantially improved array system. 
 
 As a check on our refined employer-sorting method, we tested the procedure in reverse—
that is, first sorting by benefit ratio, then by reserve ratio. This second alternative is not 
recommended. By sorting first by benefit ratio and then by reserve ratio, companies with little 
recent UI usage but large negative account balances would be assigned to experience-factor 
groups that would give substantial tax cuts relative to their reserve position. At the same time, 
employers’ high levels of recent UI benefit charges—but with high positive reserve balances—
would face large tax increases. The second area of concern with reversing the sort method was 
that year-to-year changes in the tax rates faced by employers were much more volatile. Under 
this method, more employers would face large increases or decreases in their tax rates compared 
to the year before. We believe such volatility or unpredictability to be undesirable from the point 
of view of the employer, as well as from the standpoint of UI administration. 
 
 
Nebraska methodology are the result of attempting to apply that scenario to Louisiana, and it was expected that 
modifications would be needed. 
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 If Louisiana decides to further investigate the array methodology for assigning UI tax 
rates, we recommend the following: 
 
• Instead of calculating the average tax rate over one year, the computation should be done 
over a period of three to five years to yield a financing system that is countercyclical. In 
our final simulations, we used a five-year recovery period. 
 
• The tax system “yield factor” depends on the actual UI trust-fund account balance 
relative to the desired level. We set a target reserve of $1 billion, or approximately 1.6 
percent of 2011 total wages in Louisiana. That value falls within the range of 1.50 to 1.65 
percent on the Nebraska yield-factor table assigning a score of 1.00. Each state would 
have to set its own table of yield factors. Parameters in that table reflect the target level of 
system reserves, a choice dependent on the subjective attitudes of state policymakers 
toward the risk of a funding shortfall and the consequences of a funding shortfall.    
 
• Our simulations suggest that employers should be allocated to one of 20 experience-
factor groups based on sorting first by their reserve ratios and then, within those groups, 
by their benefit ratios. The revised experience factors based on this sorting strategy 
produced a desired change in the distribution of tax burdens over the simulation period, 
particularly when revenue estimates for 2012 were included.  
5.  ANCILLARY ANALYSES 
5.1  Computation of Tax Rates to Cover UI System Socialized Costs 
 In all state UI systems, some benefit-payment costs are not directly chargeable to 
employers. These are called noncharged benefits. There are also other pooled UI system costs for 
things like program administration and sometimes special job training, which are paid for 
collectively. Taken together, these pooled costs are called social costs of the system. States cover 
these costs by placing a levy on employers’ taxable wages. Such a tax is sometimes a uniform 
rate paid on all taxable wages of all employers. However, in some states, it is based entirely or in 
part on employers’ UI benefit-charge experience. Social taxes in Louisiana are proportionate to 
the employer’s UI-experience tax rate. 
 
 Following are three categories of socialized costs due to noncharged benefits, as defined 
in Significant Measures of State Unemployment Insurance Tax Systems (USDOL 2013b).  
 
1) Benefits noncharged to employers: The amount of benefits attributable to taxable 
employers but not charged to individual employer accounts. 
 
2) Benefits charged to inactive accounts: Benefits assigned to employers that are no 
longer active. 
 
3) Benefits charged to employers at the maximum tax rate in excess of the 
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estimated contributions from those employers: The amount by which benefit 
charges exceed contributions from employers that are assigned the maximum tax rate 
in the state’s tax schedule for the year. Also called “ineffective charges.” 
 
 In Louisiana, the first category is large and rising: Louisiana charges UI benefits against 
the accounts of all employers in a claimant’s UI base period in proportion to the value of wages 
paid by that employer. Table 7 shows the recent history of UI social charges in Louisiana as a 
generally rising proportion of taxable wages. However, in Louisiana, base-period employers who 
are not the separating employer can protest the charges by asserting no responsibility for the 
joblessness. Such employer protests result in noncharges being an increasing share of all UI 
benefits paid. The second category, inactive accounts, typically rise in recessions when 
businesses cease operations because of a slowdown in sales. The third category of ineffective 
charges is a persistent problem resulting from limits on the maximum tax rate and taxable wage 
base. Employers that regularly generate high rates of layoffs eventually move to extreme 
negative reserve positions because the tax rate and taxable wage base cannot generate sufficient 
contributions to cover accumulated benefit charges. Additionally, this situation leads to employer 
withdrawal from involvement in the UI system through failing to contest claims that should in 
some cases be denied because of the circumstances of job separation. Such employer behavior 
reduces the insurance aspect of UI as social insurance and increases the level of socialized costs 
in the system.   
 
Table 7  Louisiana UI Social Charges, 1978–2010  
Years “Social” charges ($) 
Taxable wages 
($1,000s) 
Social charges as % of 
taxable wages 
1978–1982 20,341,904 40,127,427 0.051 
1983–1989 121,563,548 62,262,733 0.195 
1990–1995 80,277,357 54,473,461 0.147 
1996–2000 99,447,844 58,714,744 0.169 
2001–2005 138,027,910 58,599,343 0.236 
2006 22,019,586 12,406,468 0.177 
2007 15,818,278 12,930,004 0.122 
2008 18,113,814 13,071,250 0.139 
2009 23,985,151 12,492,802 0.192 
2010 39,384,637 13,434,175 0.293 
Total/average 578,980,029 338,512,407 0.171 
SOURCE: Social charges compiled from reports by the Louisiana Workforce Commission. Taxable wages based on reports in UI 
Financial Data Handbook, Employment and Training Handbook 394, USDOL (2013a).   
 
 The Louisiana method for determining the social charge tax rate has three main 
components: 1) the nonchargeable benefits component, 2) the incumbent worker training-fund 
tax, and 3) the supplemental-fund integrity tax. A nonchargeable account (NCA) balance is 
maintained as a year-end running total. New noncharges are totaled and balanced with revenues 
from the social tax for noncharges and applied to the outstanding balance from the prior year. 
The accumulated total of net noncharges has been running an accumulated negative total in 
Louisiana for the past 30 years. The size of the deficit has increased annually by millions of 
dollars in each of the past several years. Each year, a nonchargeable social-cost tax rate is set, but 
every year the account fails to balance. At year-end 2012, the reserve deficit for this component 
was 18.70 percent of total expected tax revenues in 2013. So, the NCA rate was set at 18.70 
percent for 2013.  
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 Louisiana operates an incumbent worker training (IWT) fund that is financed by a factor 
included in the social charge tax. The incumbent worker tax can be positive only in years when 
the forecast reserve balance exceeds $750 million. The IWT tax is set as the ratio of the IWT 
target revenues relative to projected income from experience-rated employers. The IWT rate was 
set at 12.55 percent. 
 
 A target level of supplemental UI funding is set by a Louisiana Workforce Commission 
(LWC) committee to buttress the UI reserve fund annually. The supplemental integrity (SI) tax is 
computed as the ratio of the supplemental-funding target level to projected total system revenues. 
The SI tax rate was set at 2.24 percent for 2013.  
 
 By Louisiana statute, to determine individual employer social-charge tax rates, the three 
factors for determining the social-charge tax rate, listed above, are separately multiplied by the 
employer rate from the tax rate schedule after the 10 percent FUTA offset reduction, with each 
result rounded to the nearest 0.01 percent. Then those three results are added together, and the 
result rounded to the nearest 0.01 percent. As summarized in Table 8, we performed that 
procedure with an Excel spreadsheet and arrived at rates slightly different from the published 
values. Algebra suggests the order of the operations does not matter, and numerical computations 
confirm that in this case the sequence of rounding does not affect the results either, but our final 
list of social tax rates in Table 8 differs from the official list. Ignoring the top rate, which must be 
truncated to 6.2 percent, of the 62 rates in the table, there are 22 differences from our 
computations. Twelve rates are too low and 10 too high, with differences of plus or minus 0.01 
percentage points in every case.   
 
 Table 8 also shows that the simple ratio of the social-charges tax rate to the total tax rate 
differs across rate groups. The social-charges tax rate is 25 percent of the total tax rate for most 
rate groups in 2013. At the top and bottom of the rate range, the proportion is different from 25 
percent because of the maximum and minimum limits on rates, but this result is not good policy 
in terms of tax equity. Furthermore, for five other rate groups, the ratio is either 24 or 26 percent. 
 
 There are some other concerns about computation of the social charge rate. It turns out 
that the rate computation for each group should be equivalent whether the three factors are 
summed, then rounded and applied, or whether the rates are applied, then summed and rounded. 
But a problem exists because of the rules of arithmetic. Additionally, year-after-year net 
revenues are not sufficient to eliminate the noncharge account balance. This is partly because 
rates do not depend on a forecast of current year noncharges. Furthermore, the social charge 
factors are applied to experience-determined basic rates, and no accounting of taxable wages by 
experience group is considered in setting rates to achieve target revenues. Presumably, the 
revenue-forecasting methodology considers the distribution of taxable wages by basic tax rates, 
but that principle should be extended to social taxes if they are to be experience rated. A more 
tractable approach would be to simply make the social tax a flat tax applied equally to the 
taxable wages of all employers. Since these costs are not assignable to individual employers, 
equity considerations suggest a flat tax on wages is a fair way to cover these costs for the group. 
A flat social tax is used by several states, and most of these states simply add the social-charge 
tax rate to each employer’s basic rate. Multiplying the social factor by the basic rate dilutes risk 
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pooling and complicates revenue forecasting. Ten states assess a social charge, and most apply it 
as an add factor (USDOL 2013a). Indeed, the BFM at USDOL is set up to forecast revenues 
from a social-charge tax rate as an add factor.   
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Table 8  Social-Charge Rate Determination, Checking Uniform (Social Charge/Total Rate) Rate 















Total rate minus 
alternates 
5.40 0.80 6.20 0.13 1.81 1.81 1.81 -1.01 
2.80 0.93 3.73 0.25 0.94 0.94 0.94 -0.01 
2.77 0.93 3.70 0.25 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.00 
2.74 0.91 3.65 0.25 0.92 0.92 0.92 -0.01 
2.72 0.91 3.63 0.25 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.00 
2.69 0.90 3.59 0.25 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.00 
2.66 0.89 3.55 0.25 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.00 
2.64 0.88 3.52 0.25 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.00 
2.62 0.88 3.50 0.25 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.00 
2.60 0.88 3.48 0.25 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.01 
2.57 0.86 3.43 0.25 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.00 
2.56 0.86 3.42 0.25 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.00 
2.14 0.72 2.86 0.25 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.00 
2.13 0.72 2.85 0.25 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.01 
2.12 0.72 2.84 0.25 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.01 
2.11 0.70 2.81 0.25 0.71 0.71 0.71 -0.01 
2.11 0.70 2.81 0.25 0.71 0.71 0.71 -0.01 
1.93 0.64 2.57 0.25 0.65 0.65 0.65 -0.01 
1.91 0.64 2.55 0.25 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.00 
1.90 0.64 2.54 0.25 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.00 
1.88 0.63 2.51 0.25 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.00 
1.87 0.62 2.49 0.25 0.63 0.63 0.63 -0.01 
1.84 0.61 2.45 0.25 0.62 0.62 0.62 -0.01 
1.80 0.61 2.41 0.25 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.01 
1.75 0.59 2.34 0.25 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.00 
1.71 0.57 2.28 0.25 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.00 
1.70 0.57 2.27 0.25 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.00 
1.66 0.56 2.22 0.25 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.00 
1.66 0.56 2.22 0.25 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.00 
1.65 0.56 2.21 0.25 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.01 
1.64 0.56 2.20 0.25 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.01 
1.63 0.54 2.17 0.25 0.55 0.55 0.55 -0.01 
1.62 0.54 2.16 0.25 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.00 
1.60 0.54 2.14 0.25 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.00 
1.59 0.54 2.13 0.25 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.01 
1.58 0.54 2.12 0.25 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.01 
1.57 0.53 2.10 0.25 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.00 
1.57 0.53 2.10 0.25 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.00 
1.56 0.52 2.08 0.25 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.00 
1.54 0.51 2.05 0.25 0.52 0.52 0.52 -0.01 
1.53 0.51 2.04 0.25 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.00 
1.48 0.50 1.98 0.25 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.00 
1.40 0.47 1.87 0.25 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.00 
1.24 0.42 1.66 0.25 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.00 
1.13 0.38 1.51 0.25 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.00 
1.08 0.36 1.44 0.25 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.00 
0.98 0.32 1.30 0.25 0.33 0.33 0.33 -0.01 
0.93 0.31 1.24 0.25 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.00 
0.90 0.30 1.20 0.25 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.00 
0.79 0.27 1.06 0.25 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.01 
0.71 0.24 0.95 0.25 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.00 
0.66 0.21 0.87 0.24 0.22 0.22 0.22 -0.01 
0.63 0.21 0.84 0.25 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.00 
0.53 0.18 0.71 0.25 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.00 
0.45 0.15 0.60 0.25 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.00 
0.40 0.13 0.53 0.25 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.00 
0.31 0.11 0.42 0.26 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.01 
0.26 0.09 0.35 0.26 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.00 
0.21 0.07 0.28 0.25 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.00 
0.19 0.06 0.25 0.24 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.00 
0.13 0.04 0.17 0.24 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.00 
0.08 0.02 0.10 0.20 0.03 0.03 0.03 -0.01 
SOURCE: Louisiana Workforce Commission and author’s computations. 
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5.2  Persistence of Employers in Same Tax-Rate Groups over Time 
Both the micro- and macrosimulation results draw attention to tax rate maximums and 
minimums. Understanding more about these extremes is important to shaping policy reform. 
Based on employer microdata for 2006 through 2011, we looked at employer persistence in rate 
steps. The main finding is that employers paying tax rates at or near either the maximum or 
minimum have remained near the extremes of the tax distribution for many years. Furthermore, 
employers away from these extremes are much more likely to see their UI tax rates change year-
to-year. 
 
Simulation results suggest that changes in the tax schedule since 1998 have significantly 
reduced revenue recovery at the negative extreme of the reserve ratio distribution. In particular, 
changes about when the maximum rate becomes effective and the pattern of rates just below the 
maximum rate have had big effects. In 1998 a reserve ratio of −30 set an employer’s tax rate at 
the maximum of 6.47 percent. However, in every year since 1999, the maximum rate has not 
been reached until the reserve ratio rises to −1,000—that is, until employers have excess benefit 
charges amounting to at least 10 times their taxable payrolls. This threshold is a dramatic change 
from the 1998 standard of debt amounting to 0.3 times taxable payrolls. Since 2005, the second 
highest rate has been 4.04 percent or lower every year. But in 2013, rates for reserve ratios 
between −999 and −30 range between 3.73 and 3.55 percent. These changes have greatly 
reduced revenue recovery from negative-balance employers and have reduced tax equity in the 
system. 
 
Since there are about 56 rate groups in the Louisiana UI tax schedule over the past dozen 
years, we used one row for each tax-rate group to produce pairs tables—first showing negative-
reserve-balance employers on the first page, then positive-reserve-balance employers on the 
second page. The idea is to view employer tax groups from top to bottom on the two tables as 
they would be arrayed left to right along a horizontal axis measuring reserve ratio negative to 
positive. The top row in the first table is the extreme negative-balance group, and the bottom row 
on the first page is the group near zero reserves. The top row on the second table presents 
employers with just slightly positive reserves, and the bottom row the highest positive-balance 
group with the lowest tax rate.   
 
Tables D1 and D2 present a summary of reserve-ratio step persistence over the whole six-
year span of data, from 2006 through 2011. The second pair of tables, D3 and D4, report 
proportions of employers in each rate group remaining in that same group for at least one more 
year. These groups approximate the tax-rate steps over the period. 
 
As shown in Table D1, among the 47,298 experience-rated employers who are present in 
the data for all six years, 27 had reserve ratios of negative 1,000 or lower in at least one of those 
six years, and 19 of those 27 (70 percent) remained in that range all six years. There were 1,064 
employers with reserve ratios of negative 30 or worse in at least one of the six years. Our 
previous microanalysis suggests that these employers accumulated negative balances amounting 
to about $600 million in outstanding debt to the Louisiana UI system. Of the 1,064 employers, 
439 (41.3 percent) had a negative reserve balance of −30 or lower in all of the five years 
observed. Persistence in the −30 or worse group was accommodated to some degree by the 
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dramatic reduction in rates over this range since 1998. That is, rates were too low for these 
employers to contribute sufficiently to raise their reserve ratios and lower their tax rates. 
Experience rating is not working for this group, and they are being subsidized in the system by 
employers making contributions in excess of their benefit charges.   
 
At the positive end of the reserve ratio distribution, Table D2 reports that 65.2 percent of 
the 17,883 employers in the lowest tax-rate group remained in that group all five years between 
2006 and 2011. Our previous analysis showed that the low levels of contributions paid by these 
employers were not sufficient to cover benefit charges accrued by them over the five-year 
period.  
 
Virtually all employers with reserve ratios in the range from −30 to 9.5 moved between 
steps in the rate schedule at least once in the five-year period analyzed. Table D3 for negative-
balance employers and D4 for positive-balance employers shows the year-to-year persistence in 
rate steps. In Table D3, we see that for reserve ratios at or below −30, the year-to-year rate group 
persistence is high, ranging between 0.448 and 0.927. For negative-balance employers with 
reserve ratios above −30, the year-to-year rate group persistence ranges between 0.072 and 
0.380, with the latter portion being on a very wide step—five points from −20 to −15. Similarly, 
for positive-balance employers, we see in Appendix Table D4 a low degree of year-to-year rate 
persistence for reserve ratios between 0 and 9.5, but a very high rate of remaining in the highest 
reserve-ratio rate group, 9.5 or more, which is associated with the lowest tax rate.   
6. SUMMARY 
 As a way to summarize the themes that emerge from the analyses presented in this report, 
we list six policy options that could be undertaken separately or in combination. Additional 
evidence supporting some of these reforms is provided in Figure 7 and Appendix Table A6. Here 
are the options: 
 
1.  Return to the 1998 tax schedule for negative-balance employers with reserve ratios of 
−30 or smaller. That is, let negative-balance employers reach the maximum tax rate when 
their reserve balance is −30 or smaller. Additionally, instead of a steep drop in rates just 
above the −30 reserve ratio, it would be better to have a gradual steady decline in rates as 
reserve ratios improve.   
 
2. Eliminate the four procedures that change the taxable wage base (TWB) and maximum 
weekly benefit amount (WBA) depending on the dollar value of the reserve balance. 
These can cause procyclical problems. Index the TWB and max WBA to the average 
weekly wage (AWW) in UI-covered employment. We suggest the following modest 
reforms: TWB = 0.25*AWW*13, and max WBA = 0.33*AWW, rounding to the nearest 
dollar. The suggested maximum benefit would improve adequacy of wage replacement, 
but it is only half the rate suggested by the federal ACUC (1996). The TWB formula 
would leave Louisiana in the bottom 20 percent of states, but this change would add 
automatic balance to the system.  
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3. Revise the method for computing the WBA. Eliminate the full set of factors multiplying 
the WBA amount produced by the formula. The net effect of these factors is to increase 
the WBA by between 3 and 39 percent when the WBA is below the maximum WBA. If 
the WBA maximum is indexed to AWW, adequate wage replacement will be extended. 
After eliminating the WBA factors, the WBA formula should be revised to be based on 
high-quarter earnings.   
 
4. Change the formula for WBA below the maximum to WBA = (1/25)*(Average of 
earnings in the two highest quarters in the base period). This will improve adequacy of 
wage replacement, since the earnings measure will be less likely to include periods of 
joblessness. The current formula is (1/25)*(Total base period earnings)/4.   
 
5. Switch the social charges tax from a proportion of the current experience-rated tax rate to 
a flat tax paid uniformly by all employers on all taxable wages. This will increase the 
reliability of revenue recovery and will more equitably share pooled system costs. 
Additionally, it will replace the current problematic methodology. Truncation and 
rounding problems under the current social tax system result in different proportional 
social-charge rates across tax rate groups. At a minimum, the existing procedures should 
be corrected to assure that the proportionate effect is the same for all rate groups, but a 
better solution would be a flat social charge around 0.25 percent, adjusted annually 
(Table 7). 
 
6. Switch the tax table to a tax formula. Simply set the following parameters: positive-
balance maximum rate, positive-balance minimum rate, negative-balance maximum rate, 
negative-balance minimum rate, and the reserve ratios at which these limits are effective. 
These parameters determine the slopes of the positive and negative schedules. Keep the 
rule stipulating that results are rounded to the nearest 0.01 percentage point. Next, specify 
a set of formulas and the relative measure of reserve adequacy to shift between them. For 
example, if reserves are below the target level of 0.98 times taxable wages, then there 
will be movement to a higher schedule, and vice versa. The number of formulas and the 
thresholds for shifting among them remain to be worked out. As a graphical example, see 
Figure 7. 
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Figure 8 illustrates the pattern of year-end reserve balances over time under some of the 




The dark blue line repeats the baseline pattern of year-end reserve balances to provide a 
visual comparison to the reforms analyzed.   
 
The purple line shows reserves if the maximum rate applies to employers with reserve 
ratios of −30 or lower, and the 2011 rates apply to other employers. A very slight rise in reserves 









Figure 7  Linearized UI Tax Schedule between Reserve Ratios of −30 and +15; 
Schedule Shifts for High and Low Reserve Levels
Base Case Low Fund High Fund
Figure 8  Calendar Year-End Reserve Balance under Baseline and Variations,
with 1998 Tax Ranges
Baseline 2011 1998 All
1998 Negative 1998 below -30
1998 Neg Index TWB Max WBA
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The green line shows the effect of adopting the 1998 rate system for all negative-balance 
employers, and the 2011 rates apply to other employers. This system raises revenues over time 
and would accommodate modest benefit improvements while maintaining adequate reserves.   
 
The light-blue line plots year-end reserves under the 1998 tax rate system for all 
negative-balance employers, the 2011 rates apply to other employers, the TWB is indexed to the 
AWW, and the maximum WBA is indexed to the AWW, as suggested earlier in this summary. 
Together these reforms put the system on a sustainable path, but the rise in reserve balances 
suggests that generally lower rate schedules would be sufficient, as the TWB rises over time. 
Lowering tax rates while broadening the tax base will benefit workers and employers in low-
wage firms where job growth may be hindered currently by work being shifted to higher-wage 
companies that are taxed on a smaller proportion of their wage bill.   
 
Like the dark-blue baseline, the red line is provided as a reference. The red line 
represents the levels of calendar-year-end reserves if the 1998 tax system were restored. This is a 
separate benchmark used as a contrast for considering the other options presented.  
 
In this final report and the interim documents provided, the Upjohn Institute has provided 
the Louisiana Workforce Commission (LWC) with a comprehensive understanding of how the 
Louisiana UI benefit and financing system is operating and put forth the prospects for future 
system performance. In this concluding section, we have suggested some policy options and 
ideas. We hope this analysis and menu of options lead to system improvements. We have 
developed the apparatus to examine changes to the Louisiana UI system and are ready to 
examine additional policy options that may be of interest to the LWC.   
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Table A1  Baseline Economic-Scenario Macrosimulations of Louisiana UI Trust Fund Reserves ($000s) 
Baseline 





2012 2 2.00 237,485 231,019 9,680 240,698 22,219 756,531 
2013 2 2.00 261,107 262,205 25,111 287,315 23,358 800,097 
2014 2 2.00 268,441 211,783 16,357 228,140 24,030 783,826 
2015 2 2.00 276,940 196,283 13,949 210,232 23,039 740,157 
2016 2 1.67 240,761 197,499 13,058 210,557 22,098 732,050 
2017 2 1.36 208,010 201,369 13,140 214,509 22,390 760,939 
2018 2 1.35 210,142 202,383 13,387 215,769 31,274 797,841 
2019 2 1.40 220,827 201,709 13,587 215,296 32,624 824,935 
2020 2 1.46 233,437 201,551 13,766 215,317 33,526 840,341 
2021 2 1.53 239,510 202,470 13,939 216,409 34,076 851,317 
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Table A2  Relative to Baseline Economic-Scenario Macrosimulations of Louisiana UI Trust Fund Reserves 
($000s) 
Mild 





2012 2 2.00 237,485 231,019 9,680 240,698 22,219 756,531 
2013 2 2.00 260,959 262,331 25,122 287,453 23,440 800,464 
2014 2 2.50 331,757 210,799 16,286 227,085 23,257 719,050 
2015 2 2.00 277,663 197,448 13,927 211,375 20,959 673,720 
2016 2 1.67 240,761 200,547 13,060 213,607 20,121 666,687 
2017 2 1.36 208,010 204,028 13,140 217,167 20,444 696,289 
2018 2 1.35 210,142 204,616 13,387 218,003 28,691 732,841 
2019 2 1.40 220,827 203,409 13,587 216,997 30,017 759,028 
2020 2 1.46 233,437 203,100 13,766 216,866 30,878 773,336 
2021 2 1.53 239,510 203,821 13,939 217,761 31,381 782,968 
Moderate 





2012 2 2.00 237,485 231,019 9,680 240,698 22,219 756,531 
2013 2 2.00 260,820 262,449 25,133 287,582 23,518 800,811 
2014 2 3.00 394,861 209,805 16,224 226,029 22,574 654,553 
2015 2 2.50 343,733 197,253 13,840 211,094 18,068 539,981 
2016 2 1.67 238,624 204,001 13,043 217,044 15,995 534,396 
2017 1 1.36 198,671 224,391 14,005 238,397 16,805 590,926 
2018 1 1.35 198,799 223,573 14,348 237,920 24,972 655,019 
2019 1 1.40 210,088 218,749 14,550 233,299 27,395 705,625 
2020 2 1.46 233,437 203,360 13,863 217,224 28,740 718,152 
2021 2 1.53 239,510 201,789 13,939 215,728 29,104 723,475 
Severe 





2012 2 2.00 237,485 231,019 9,680 240,698 22,219 756,531 
2013 2 2.00 260,696 262,555 25,143 287,698 23,587 801,120 
2014 2 3.47 453,959 208,776 16,175 224,951 22,033 594,145 
2015 2 3.59 480,001 195,746 13,695 209,441 14,573 338,158 
2016 1 2.82 382,070 221,347 13,706 235,053 8,090 199,231 
2017 1 1.36 199,974 238,695 14,060 252,755 6,572 258,583 
2018 1 1.35 198,799 239,877 14,353 254,230 11,767 325,782 
2019 1 1.40 206,673 232,523 14,550 247,072 14,303 380,483 
2020 1 1.46 215,526 225,099 14,729 239,828 16,273 421,059 
2021 1 1.53 219,635 221,772 14,901 236,673 17,793 455,889 
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2012 2 2.00 237,485 263,137 9,680 272,817 21,666 757,097 
2013 2 2.00 261,107 371,858 25,111 396,969 22,331 800,290 
2014 2 2.00 268,441 329,260 16,357 345,617 25,578 903,044 
2015 2 2.00 276,940 309,235 13,949 323,183 28,174 977,461 
2016 2 1.67 240,761 304,422 13,058 317,480 30,742 1,084,921 
2017 2 1.36 208,010 302,093 13,140 315,233 34,466 1,226,610 
2018 2 1.35 211,430 296,540 13,387 309,927 51,897 1,377,003 
2019 3 1.40 227,998 272,682 12,830 285,512 57,424 1,491,941 
2020 4 1.46 247,282 247,449 12,924 260,373 61,306 1,566,338 
2021 4 1.53 255,828 241,455 13,098 254,553 64,002 1,629,065 
         
Linear tax 2011 shift in       
2012 2 2.00 237,485 234,991 9,680 244,671 22,124 755,409 
2013 2 2.00 261,107 289,692 25,111 314,802 23,065 800,168 
2014 2 2.00 268,441 264,704 16,357 281,060 24,686 837,474 
2015 2 2.00 276,940 257,887 13,949 271,836 25,479 857,849 
2016 2 1.67 240,761 259,445 13,058 272,503 26,501 916,091 
2017 2 1.36 208,010 262,485 13,140 275,625 28,799 1,012,506 
2018 2 1.35 210,142 260,762 13,387 274,149 42,554 1,119,067 
2019 2 1.40 222,231 256,866 13,587 270,454 46,671 1,213,960 
2020 3 1.46 237,584 239,320 13,009 252,329 50,000 1,278,705 
2021 3 1.53 245,613 236,645 13,098 249,742 52,416 1,335,250 
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Table A4  Linear 2011 Shifted-in Economic Scenario, Macrosimulations of Louisiana UI Trust Fund 
Reserves ($000s) 
Mild 





2012 2 2.00 237,485 234,991 9,680 244,671 22,124 755,409 
2013 2 2.00 260,959 289,832 25,122 314,954 23,147 800,551 
2014 2 2.50 331,757 263,097 16,286 279,383 23,907 772,084 
2015 2 2.00 277,663 260,264 13,927 274,191 23,393 792,005 
2016 2 1.67 240,761 265,488 13,060 278,548 24,579 854,371 
2017 2 1.36 208,010 267,449 13,140 280,589 26,997 953,947 
2018 2 1.35 210,142 265,810 13,387 279,197 40,266 1,063,269 
2019 2 1.40 220,827 260,422 13,587 274,010 44,483 1,160,935 
2020 2 1.46 234,961 256,535 13,766 270,301 48,173 1,244,448 
2021 3 1.53 245,613 239,775 13,183 252,958 51,109 1,302,902 
Moderate 





2012 2 2.00 237,485 234,991 9,680 244,671 22,124 755,409 
2013 2 2.00 260,820 289,965 25,133 315,098 23,225 800,913 
2014 2 3.00 394,861 261,794 16,224 278,018 23,220 707,290 
2015 2 2.50 343,733 260,445 13,840 274,286 20,495 658,337 
2016 2 1.67 238,624 273,146 13,043 286,189 20,504 726,406 
2017 1 1.36 201,431 298,369 14,005 312,374 23,603 860,952 
2018 2 1.35 210,142 276,353 13,483 289,836 36,724 977,370 
2019 2 1.40 220,827 266,144 13,587 279,731 41,104 1,077,379 
2020 2 1.46 234,961 260,511 13,766 274,277 44,857 1,161,552 
2021 3 1.53 245,613 243,106 13,183 256,289 47,806 1,220,034 
Severe 





2012 2 2.00 237,485 234,991 9,680 244,671 22,124 755,409 
2013 2 2.00 260,696 290,083 25,143 315,226 23,295 801,234 
2014 2 3.47 453,959 260,429 16,175 276,604 22,676 646,555 
2015 2 3.59 486,304 259,296 13,695 272,991 16,965 450,206 
2016 2 2.82 393,097 279,142 12,862 292,004 12,073 361,187 
2017 1 1.36 199,974 321,401 13,965 335,366 12,556 509,134 
2018 1 1.35 198,799 325,653 14,353 340,006 23,480 673,821 
2019 1 1.40 210,088 310,784 14,550 325,334 29,846 818,913 
2020 2 1.46 233,437 279,949 13,863 293,812 34,770 914,059 
2021 2 1.53 239,510 270,747 13,939 284,686 38,340 997,575 
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Table A5  Various Alternative Macrosimulations of Louisiana UI Trust Fund Reserves ($000s) 
IndexTWB 





2012 1 2.00 248,760 278,429 14,973 293,402 21,356 752,097 
2013 1 2.00 279,598 366,200 34,889 401,090 22,152 795,740 
2014 1 2.00 288,043 282,390 22,476 304,867 24,546 837,111 
2015 1 2.00 303,089 250,505 19,309 269,814 25,019 828,855 
2016 2 1.67 272,755 266,375 19,615 285,990 25,151 867,240 
2017 2 1.36 240,041 271,055 19,875 290,929 26,921 945,050 
2018 3 1.35 250,235 287,789 21,631 309,420 39,388 1,043,623 
2019 3 1.40 267,827 285,279 22,003 307,281 43,177 1,126,253 
2020 4 1.46 291,028 298,369 23,524 321,893 46,297 1,203,416 
2021 4 1.53 301,910 297,265 23,834 321,099 49,250 1,271,855 
Baseline—





2012 2 2.00 234,709 231,019 9,680 240,698 15,430 452,518 
2013 1 2.00 251,792 280,350 26,781 307,131 14,469 516,326 
2014 1 2.00 258,572 226,616 17,550 244,167 15,751 517,671 
2015 1 2.00 266,389 207,957 14,993 222,950 15,259 489,492 
2016 1 1.67 231,278 206,993 14,018 221,011 14,744 493,969 
2017 1 1.36 198,671 209,013 14,098 223,112 15,396 533,805 
2018 1 1.35 198,799 209,263 14,348 223,611 22,386 581,003 
2019 1 1.40 206,673 208,014 14,550 222,563 24,208 621,101 
2020 1 1.46 219,925 206,632 14,729 221,360 25,666 648,202 
2021 2 1.53 239,510 193,825 14,036 207,862 26,139 642,694 
1998 tax 





2012 2 2.00 234,709 310,316 9,680 319,996 20,787 757,172 
2013 1 2.00 254,943 537,857 26,781 564,638 20,626 797,493 
2014 2 2.00 268,441 358,921 16,540 375,461 26,142 930,655 
2015 2 2.00 276,940 279,991 13,949 293,940 28,692 976,346 
2016 2 1.67 240,761 258,449 13,058 271,506 30,112 1,037,203 
2017 2 1.36 208,010 258,448 13,140 271,588 32,419 1,133,200 
2018 2 1.35 211,430 260,510 13,387 273,896 47,432 1,243,098 
2019 3 1.40 224,681 245,613 12,830 258,443 51,488 1,328,348 
2020 3 1.46 237,584 242,821 12,924 255,745 54,683 1,401,192 
2021 3 1.53 249,410 223,962 13,098 237,060 57,191 1,446,033 
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Table A6  Macrosimulation Results from Revised Tax Treatment of Negative Balance Employers ($000s) 
Maximum Rate at −30 and Lower, 2011 Tax Schedule above −30 Reserve Ratio 
Calendar 





2012 2 2.00 237,485 231,019 9,680 240,698 22,219 756,531 
2013 2 2.00 261,107 276,144 25,111 301,254 23,195 799,872 
2014 2 2.00 268,441 239,320 16,357 255,676 24,366 811,473 
2015 2 2.00 276,940 229,141 13,949 243,090 24,309 801,933 
2016 2 1.67 240,761 233,280 13,058 246,338 24,447 831,956 
2017 2 1.36 208,010 233,830 13,140 246,970 25,867 896,784 
2018 2 1.35 210,142 228,281 13,387 241,668 37,276 965,586 
2019 2 1.40 220,827 226,256 13,587 239,843 39,882 1,024,484 
2020 3 1.46 233,437 223,234 13,766 237,001 42,033 1,070,082 
2021 3 1.53 241,119 222,415 13,939 236,354 43,764 1,109,082 
1998 Tax Schedule For Negative Balance Employers, 2011 Tax Schedule above 0 Reserve Ratio 
Calendar 





2012 2 2.00 237,485 231,019 9,680 240,698 22,219 756,531 
2013 2 2.00 261,107 333,658 25,111 358,769 22,584 801,777 
2014 2 2.00 268,441 299,660 16,357 316,016 25,243 874,595 
2015 2 2.00 276,940 273,368 13,949 287,316 26,844 911,815 
2016 2 1.67 240,761 268,070 13,058 281,128 28,261 980,442 
2017 2 1.36 208,010 264,045 13,140 277,184 30,787 1,080,404 
2018 2 1.35 210,142 260,969 13,387 274,356 45,314 1,189,932 
2019 2 1.40 222,231 253,698 13,587 267,285 49,501 1,284,488 
2020 3 1.46 237,584 233,566 13,009 246,575 52,763 1,346,242 
2021 3 1.53 245,613 229,708 13,098 242,805 55,031 1,398,465 
1998 System For Negative with Indexed Benefits and TWB, 2011 Tax Schedule above 0 Reserve Ratio 
Calendar 





2012 2 2.00 252,785 295,963 16,931 312,894 21,121 755,329 
2013 1 2.00 279,598 473,251 35,322 508,573 21,152 803,456 
2014 1 2.00 288,043 394,310 22,476 416,787 26,226 958,426 
2015 1 2.00 303,089 338,965 19,309 358,274 29,874 1,043,485 
2016 2 1.67 272,755 345,289 19,615 364,904 32,685 1,168,319 
2017 2 1.36 240,041 340,463 19,875 360,338 36,960 1,325,577 
2018 3 1.35 253,980 351,632 21,631 373,262 55,921 1,500,781 
2019 4 1.40 274,311 334,437 23,344 357,781 62,460 1,646,711 
2020 4 1.46 291,028 320,839 23,668 344,507 67,855 1,768,045 
2021 4 1.53 301,910 311,990 23,834 335,824 72,441 1,874,400 
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DERIVATION OF A LINEAR TAX EQUATION FOR THE 2011 SCHEDULE 
 Making a linear approximation of a tax schedule involves writing the relation in the 
standard form (y = mx + b). The approximation will apply over a specified range of the x 
variable. We set the reserve ratio (RR) as x and the associated tax rate (t) as y. Therefore, our 
linear tax equation will have the general form 
 
t = m * RR + b 
 
For employers with positive reserves, the “maximum” tax rate in 2011 is 2.39 percent. Therefore, 
2.39 is the y intercept b. Our first approximation of the linear form reaches a tax rate of 
approximately zero when RR is 15. Therefore, we can solve for the slope parameter from the 
equation 0 = 2.39 + m * 15. This yields m = (−2.39/15) = −0.159. Therefore, the linear tax rate 
equation in 2011 for employers with a positive reserve balance is 
 
y = 2.39 − 0.159 * RR (0 to 15 RR; max 2.39, min 0.09) 
 
Employers with a reserve ratio greater than or equal to 15 will be assigned the minimum, 
nonzero tax rate (0.09 percent). 
 
For employers with negative reserves, the minimum 2011 tax rate is 2.45 percent. To use a linear 
function down to reserve ratio −30, at which point those employers are assigned the maximum 
tax rate (6.2 percent), the equation to solve is 
 
6.2 = 2.45 + m * (−30) 
 
Therefore, the slope parameter m = (6.2 − 2.45) / (−30) = −0.125. Thus, the linear tax rate (y) in 
2011 for employers with a negative reserve balance is 
 
y = 2.45 − 0.125 * RR (if 0 to −30 RR, t = 5.48 at RR = −29.99, then t = 6.2 at −30 and below) 
 
Shifting positive and negative tax schedules down by 0.6 yields the following linear 
approximation for positive balance employers: 
 
y = 1.79 − 0.159 * RR (0 to 8.5 RR old to 9.5, max 1.79, min 0.35, 0.21, 0.09)  
 
And for negative-balance employers: 
 
y = 1.85 − 0.125 * RR (if 0 to −30 RR, t = 5.48 at RR = −29.99, then t = 6.2 at −30 and below) 
 
Simulation Analysis of the Louisiana 
Unemployment Insurance Tax System 
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BASED ON COMPARISON OF STATE UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE 
LAWS U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR (2012) 
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2012 LOUISIANA UI TAX SYSTEM: 
Taxable wage base: $7,700 (variable based on trust-fund reserve balance) 
 
Reserve ratio tax system 
 numerator: all past net contributions back to October 1, 1941 
 denominator: average of payrolls over the past three years 
 
Benefits charged to employers in proportion to employer wages in base period earnings 
 
Employers excluded from benefit charges for nonqualifying job separations 
 
Lowest tax schedule if reserves are greater than $1.4 billion (min 0.07%, max 4.86%) 
Highest tax schedule if reserves are less than $0.4 billion (min 0.1%, max 6.2%) 
 
Computation date: June 30 
Fund trigger-date-setting rate schedule: September 1 
Effective date of new tax rates: January 1 
 
New employer rate: Up to 6.2% based on industry group average (How are industry groups 
defined?) 
 
Experience required for experience rate: 3 years 
 
Voluntary contributions: Within 30 days of rate notice (except for solvency tax, advance 
interest tax, or special assessment) 
 
Bond repayment assessment: 1.4% on $15,000 taxable wage base when bonds are 
outstanding 
Special Taxes: 
Social charges tax (noncharge, incumbent worker, social charges): The nearest 0.01%, and may 
not raise a rate above 6.2% 
 
Solvency tax: Up to 30% of contributions due when reserves are less than $100 million. The tax 
is the minimum {(($100m − balance)/projected contributions), 0.30}.  
 
Reimbursing employers:  Can be exempt from bonding requirement if choose to be a regular 
contributing employer  
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LOUISIANA UI BENEFITS SYSTEM: 
Louisiana does not have an alternate base period (ABP) for determining UI monetary eligibility. 
Louisiana did not accept any money from UI modernization grants available from the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009. 
 
Monetary eligibility:  1.5 times high-quarter wages 
Minimum high-quarter earnings: $800 
Minimum base-period earnings: $1,200 
 
Earnings to establish back-to-back new benefit year: Lesser of 6 times WBA or (3/13) of 
HQW   
 
Weekly benefit amount: 1/25 of average quarterly wages in the 4 base-period quarters times 
1.05 times 1.15 rounded to lower whole dollar 
 
Minimum WBA: $10 
Maximum WBA: $247 
 
BPE for minimum WBA: $1,200 
BPE for maximum WBA: $24,700 
 
Automatic adjustment to maximum benefit amount: 12 months’ average weekly wage 
(AWW) in UI-covered employment on March 31 times 66.67%, effective on September 1 
 
Automatic adjustment to maximum weekly benefit amount (Max WBA) and taxable wage base 
(TWB) revised by Act No. 239 of June 29, 2005, effective 1/1/2006—depends on the balance in 
the federal unemployment trust fund (UTF) Louisiana account, as follows:  
 
1) If the LUTF < $750 million, then Max WBA = $221 and TWB = $8,500, and below Max 
WBA the WBA = (1/25)(Average of 4 base-period quarterly earnings)*(0.95)*(1.03)*(1.05) 
 
2) If $750 million < LUTF <= $1.15 billion, then Max WBA = $247 and TWB = $7,700, 
and below Max WBA the WBA = (1/25)(Average of 4 base-period quarterly 
earnings)*(0.97)*(1.05)*(1.15) 
 
3) If $1.15 billion < LUTF < $1.4 billion, then Max WBA = $258 and TWB = $7,000 and 
below Max WBA the WBA = (1/25)(Average of 4 base-period quarterly earnings)*(1.05)*(1.15) 
, 
4) If $1.4 billion < LUTF then Max WBA = $284 and TWB = $7,000 and below Max WBA 
the WBA = (1/25)(Average of 4 base-period quarterly earnings)*(1.05)*(1.32) 
 
Initial waiting period: 1 week 
 
Partial UI: If weekly earnings less than WBA, disregard lesser of half of WBA or $50 
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Dependents allowance: None 
 
Entitled duration: Uniform 26 weeks 
 
Minimum potential benefits: $260 in benefit year 
Maximum potential benefits: $6,422 in benefit year 
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PERSISTENCE OF EMPLOYERS 
IN TAX RATE GROUPS OVER TIME 
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All employers 47,298 12,182 0.362   
Negative employers 5,866 465 0.079   
Positive employers 41,432 11,717 0.283   
−999.99 or less 27 19 0.704   
−500 to −999.99 21 10 0.476   
−300 to −500 38 9 0.237   
−200 to −300 60 5 0.083   
−100 to −200 153 61 0.399   
−30 to −100 765 335 0.438 439/1064 41.3% 
−28 to −30 72 0 0.000   
−26 to −28 75 0 0.000   
−24 to −26 92 0 0.000   
−22 to −24 106 0 0.000   
−20 to −22 99 0 0.000   
−15 to −20 371 2 0.005   
−14 to −15 112 0 0.000   
−13 to −14 94 0 0.000   
−12 to −13 138 0 0.000   
−10 to −12 (*2) 284 1 0.004   
−9 to −10 178 1 0.006   
−8 to −9 215 1 0.005   
−7 to −8 213 0 0.000   
−6 to −7 265 1 0.004   
−5 to −6 278 1 0.004   
−4 to −5 310 0 0.000   
−3 to −4 408 5 0.012   
−2 to −3 457 5 0.011   
−1 to −2 470 3 0.006   
0 to −1 565 6 0.011   
NOTE: (*1) Employers in the sample must have taxable wages in all years (2006–2011) and have no recorded date of inactivity. 
Also, employers must be eligible for experience rating in every year, as given by the eligibility indicator variable in the 
microdata.  
(*2) The rows are defined to accommodate changing steps in the tax schedule. For some years, the same tax rate applies to more 
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all years Share 
Positive employers 41,432 11,717 0.283 
0.0 to 1.2 (*2) 1,027 34 0.033 
1.2 to 2 (*2) 687 6 0.009 
2.0 to 2.4 395 3 0.008 
2.4 to 2.8 487 1 0.002 
2.8 to 3.2 946 1 0.001 
3.2 to 3.6 653 1 0.002 
3.6 to 4.0 638 0 0.000 
4.0 to 4.8 (*2) 1,657 4 0.002 
4.8 to 5.0 422 0 0.000 
5.0 to 5.2 414 0 0.000 
5.2 to 5.4 447 0 0.000 
5.4 to 5.6 490 0 0.000 
5.6 to 5.8 572 0 0.000 
5.8 to 6.0 620 0 0.000 
6.0 to 6.2 635 0 0.000 
6.2 to 6.4 624 0 0.000 
6.4 to 6.6 714 0 0.000 
6.6 to 6.8 706 0 0.000 
6.8 to 7.0 718 0 0.000 
7.0 to 7.2 865 0 0.000 
7.2 to 7.4 876 0 0.000 
7.4 to 7.6 868 0 0.000 
7.6 to 7.8 857 0 0.000 
7.8 to 8.0 845 0 0.000 
8.0 to 8.2 872 1 0.001 
8.2 to 8.4 920 0 0.000 
8.4 to 8.6 894 0 0.000 
8.6 to 8.8 857 0 0.000 
8.8 to 9.0 879 0 0.000 
9.0 to 9.2 812 0 0.000 
9.2 to 9.5 1,152 1 0.001 
9.5 or more 17,883 11,665 0.652 
NOTE: (*1) Employers in the sample must have taxable wages in all years (2006‒2011) and have no recorded date of inactivity. 
Also, employers must be eligible for experience rating in every year, as given by the eligibility indicator variable in the 
microdata.   
(*2) The rows are defined to accommodate changing steps in the tax schedule. For some years, the same tax rate applies to more 
than one of the listed steps.   
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Table D3  Year-to-Year Probability of Remaining in a Given Reserve Ratio Range in Louisiana 
Year   
Share in the same range in the subsequent year 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
All employers 0.418 0.420 0.422 0.413 0.384 
Negative employers 0.271 0.273 0.279 0.288 0.248 
Positive employers 0.440 0.441 0.441 0.429 0.405 
Reserve ratio range      
−999.99 or less 0.927 0.840 0.889 0.780 0.837 
−500 to −999.99 0.813 0.698 0.658 0.690 0.667 
−300 to −500 0.547 0.444 0.563 0.679 0.611 
−200 to −300 0.662 0.558 0.448 0.540 0.602 
−100 to −200 0.747 0.710 0.701 0.733 0.712 
−30 to −100 0.806 0.787 0.806 0.801 0.787 
−28 to −30 0.053 0.106 0.132 0.116 0.093 
−26 to −28 0.118 0.149 0.115 0.134 0.123 
−24 to −26 0.091 0.142 0.072 0.119 0.062 
−22 to −24 0.111 0.081 0.152 0.133 0.115 
−20 to −22 0.141 0.136 0.145 0.119 0.086 
−15 to −20 0.345 0.374 0.380 0.367 0.252 
−14 to −15 0.101 0.087 0.094 0.098 0.069 
−13 to −14 0.096 0.146 0.131 0.092 0.093 
−12 to −13 0.088 0.101 0.101 0.130 0.081 
−10 to −12 (*2) 0.202 0.222 0.188 0.190 0.150 
−9 to −10 0.120 0.151 0.164 0.090 0.077 
−8 to −9 0.124 0.134 0.123 0.104 0.106 
−7 to −8 0.133 0.121 0.107 0.112 0.075 
−6 to −7 0.115 0.119 0.098 0.135 0.067 
−5 to −6 0.154 0.121 0.125 0.150 0.107 
−4 to −5 0.147 0.117 0.127 0.127 0.078 
−3 to −4 0.139 0.129 0.124 0.140 0.077 
−2 to −3 0.120 0.149 0.138 0.118 0.093 
−1 to −2 0.129 0.114 0.093 0.130 0.128 
0 to −1 0.148 0.106 0.116 0.135 0.105 
NOTE: (*1) The sample includes employers eligible for experience rating and having taxable wages in the indicated fiscal year 
and the subsequent year. Experience-rating eligibility is based on the indicator passed in the microdata. Employers must either 
have no inactivity date or become inactive two years or more after the indicated fiscal year.   
(*2) The rows are defined to accommodate changing steps in the tax schedule. For some years, the same tax rate applies to more 
than one of the listed steps.   
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Table D4  Year-to-Year Proportion Remaining in a Given Reserve Ratio Range in Louisiana 
Year   
Share in the same range in the subsequent year 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
All positive employers 0.440 0.441 0.441 0.429 0.405 
reserve ratio range      
0.0 to 1.2 (*2) 0.161 0.172 0.202 0.228 0.214 
1.2 to 2 (*2) 0.132 0.111 0.117 0.141 0.134 
2.0 to 2.4 0.063 0.064 0.066 0.081 0.074 
2.4 to 2.8 0.054 0.060 0.055 0.066 0.070 
2.8 to 3.2 0.044 0.038 0.049 0.055 0.047 
3.2 to 3.6 0.071 0.046 0.057 0.067 0.062 
3.6 to 4.0 0.065 0.048 0.055 0.078 0.062 
4.0 to 4.8 (*2) 0.161 0.112 0.143 0.138 0.122 
4.8 to 5.0 0.027 0.032 0.053 0.051 0.041 
5.0 to 5.2 0.038 0.036 0.030 0.052 0.053 
5.2 to 5.4 0.055 0.045 0.029 0.040 0.031 
5.4 to 5.6 0.040 0.043 0.038 0.045 0.028 
5.6 to 5.8 0.043 0.045 0.053 0.041 0.038 
5.8 to 6.0 0.075 0.091 0.050 0.038 0.045 
6.0 to 6.2 0.062 0.069 0.071 0.080 0.061 
6.2 to 6.4 0.062 0.062 0.078 0.060 0.050 
6.4 to 6.6 0.058 0.080 0.063 0.055 0.055 
6.6 to 6.8 0.070 0.065 0.073 0.069 0.051 
6.8 to 7.0 0.073 0.064 0.079 0.070 0.063 
7.0 to 7.2 0.085 0.060 0.082 0.071 0.062 
7.2 to 7.4 0.066 0.078 0.083 0.073 0.056 
7.4 to 7.6 0.064 0.068 0.079 0.079 0.060 
7.6 to 7.8 0.081 0.093 0.074 0.086 0.062 
7.8 to 8.0 0.076 0.089 0.078 0.082 0.073 
8.0 to 8.2 0.065 0.081 0.079 0.087 0.071 
8.2 to 8.4 0.071 0.086 0.086 0.089 0.083 
8.4 to 8.6 0.071 0.096 0.076 0.076 0.116 
8.6 to 8.8 0.091 0.086 0.082 0.070 0.140 
8.8 to 9.0 0.085 0.077 0.074 0.075 0.116 
9.0 to 9.2 0.090 0.082 0.101 0.079 0.125 
9.2 to 9.5 0.169 0.182 0.170 0.163 0.163 
9.5 or more 0.895 0.898 0.888 0.877 0.858 
NOTE: (*1) The sample includes employers eligible for experience rating and having taxable wages in the indicated fiscal year 
and the subsequent year. Experience-rating eligibility is based on the indicator passed in the microdata. Employers must either 
have no inactivity date or become inactive two years or more after the indicated fiscal year. (*2) The rows are defined to 
accommodate changing steps in the tax schedule. For some years, the same tax rate applies to more than one of the listed steps. 
 
 
